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THE EMPIRICAL SHORTCOMINGS OF FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE POWER OF HATE
SPEECH
Alexander Tsesis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Speech plays a pivotal role in the communication of ideas,
beliefs, doctrines, and schemes of action.' Verbal and sym-
bolic messages are instrumental in the transmission of social
mores and dogmas.2 Those tenets then influence persons to
act on the expressed views.
The First Amendment protects the freedom of speech and
is critical to the improvement of American society. However,
freedom of speech has not always led to the advancement of
all United States citizens. At times, individuals successfully
used free speech to advocate limiting the social opportunities
of non-privileged classes.
In its original form, the United States Constitution pro-
tected a racist institution.3 The same Constitution that pro-
tected speech through the First Amendment also institution-
alized slavery.4 The drafters of the Constitution did not
* Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Chicago Department of Law.
J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law; M.A., University of Illinois at Chicago; B.A.,
University of Wisconsin. The author is indebted to Christopher Murray, Esq.
for his evaluation and comments. The author also wishes to express gratitude
to Kenneth Obel, Esq. for his insightful corrections and criticism. Professor
Steven Heyman's profound and philosophical knowledge of First Amendment
jurisprudence was invaluable in revising an earlier draft of this article.
L See David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
445, 462 (1987).
2. See id.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST.
amends. XIII, XIV, and XV.
4. See Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied
Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82
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incorporate any protections for the speech of the slaves.5
Rather, they envisioned the First Amendment as a constraint
against the censorship of "political, scientific, and artistic dis-
course that they and their class enjoyed."6 Even after the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and the demise of
slavery, speech continues to play a role in spreading racially
intolerant views.
In the twentieth century, United States jurisprudence
has supported freedom of expression over the restriction of
hate speech.7 According to Supreme Court precedent, the
government may only sanction speakers who intend to cause
"imminent lawless action" and those who are likely to produce
such action.' On the other hand, the Court has deemed un-
constitutional laws restricting abstract utterances that are
not clearly and currently dangerous.9
The Supreme Court has found few exceptions to the con-
stitutional prohibition against legislative restrictions limiting
hate speech.'0 In assuring persons the freedom to verbally
express their views, the Court has focused on protecting the
speakers' liberties, while neglecting considerations about the
negative impact of hate speech" on members of historically
oppressed racial and ethnic groups ("outgroups"). Recent
events, such as the Littleton, Colorado shooting spree12 and
the Benjamin Smith shooting rampage in the Midwest, 3 call
CAL. L. REV. 871, 881-82 (1994).
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 449.
8. See Joseph Grinstein, Jihad and the Constitution: The First Amendment
Implications of Combating Religiously Motivated Terrorism, 105 YALE L.J.
1347, 1365 (1996).
9. See id.
10. See Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother
Should Butt In, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 77, 78 (1984).
11. Such expressions are also referred to as "biased speech." These two
terms refer to oratory that is intended to incite persecution against people be-
cause of their race, color, religion, ethnic group, or nationality. This definition
does not include verbal attacks against individuals who incidentally happen to
be members of an outgroup. However, it does include speech that is specifically
intended to oppress outgroups or lead to their destruction. See Anthony M.
Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias
Crime Statutes, 91 NW. U. L. Rev. 1015 (1997). For example, taunting a person
who happens to be black is only hate speech if that person is targeted expressly
because of his race. See id.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 224-27.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 217-23.
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for a reevaluation of contemporary free speech doctrine.
Criminal legislation prohibiting the use of racially and ethni-
cally derogatory expressions intended to incite violence
against outgroups might have deterred such tragedies.
This article evaluates the extent to which hate speech is
a catalyst for discrimination, persecution, and other forms of
oppression. Furthermore, it analyzes whether hate speech
facilitates persecution of insular minorities. If hate speech
breeds prejudice and limits an identifiable outgroup's ability
to participate in the democratic process, 4 then laws that pro-
hibit certain forms of biased expressions should be enacted.
At issue are not abstract sayings, but expressions calculated
to indoctrinate listeners with a set of beliefs justifying and
advocating the use of force and persecution against out-
groups. Restrictions should be enacted against hate speech
that is intended to elicit persecution or oppression when such
results are significantly probable.
This article suggests that hate speech is not only danger-
ous when it poses an immediate threat of harm, but also
when it is systematically developed and thereby becomes part
of culturally acceptable dialogue. Part II of this article sum-
marizes Supreme Court precedents dealing with hate speech.
Part III evaluates what role anti-Semitic speech played in
Germany in creating circumstances that made the Holocaust
possible. Part III then analyzes whether racist speech con-
tributed to the development of Black slavery and the ruthless
destruction of many Native American tribes in the United
States. Part III also contains a brief overview of the more
prevalent current racist vitriol and its consequences. Part IV
criticizes the Supreme Court's hate speech doctrine because it
is not based on empirical evidence, but rather on a relativistic
theory of law that potentially poses a threat to democracy.
Part IV also considers legislation enacted by some Western
democracies, like Germany and Canada, prohibiting certain
forms of hate propaganda. Part IV then evaluates democratic
institutions and the danger that hate speech poses to them.
Finally, Part IV discusses policy considerations lawmakers
should address in formulating statutes prohibiting the prom-
14. See Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the
Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 86 (1994) (discussing the effect of
hate speech on stigmatized minorities).
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ulgation of speech aimed at instigating racial and ethnic vio-
lence.
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS
There are two classes of laws in the United States aimed
at eradicating hate crimes: (1) penalty-enhancing criminal
statutes that increase the penalty for nonassertive acts com-
mitted with biased motives, and (2) "pure bias" criminal stat-
utes that penalize the expression of bigoted messages." The
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a penalty-
enhancement statute in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,6 while in
R.A.V. v. St. Paul the Court found a statute that prohibited
purely biased expressions, such as cross burning, unconstitu-
tional. 7 This article focuses exclusively on the latter issue;
that is, what parameters, if any, may constitutionally be es-
tablished to prohibit biased speech that threatens outgroups.
The regulation of hate speech has been based on Supreme
Court precedents.
A. The Roots ofFirst Amendment Jurisprudence
Modern First Amendment jurisprudence began with
Schenck v. United States.8 Schenck was accused of printing
and circulating a pamphlet declaring that forced conscription
violated the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against in-
voluntary servitude. 9 The Court found Schenck's intent was
to influence men not to participate in the draft." Therefore,
the Court upheld Schenck's conviction.2' Justice Holmes,
writing for the Court, based his decision on what became
known as the "clear and present danger" test:
The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
15. See Charles Lewis Nier III, Racial Hatred: A Comparative Analysis of
the Hate Crime Laws of the United States and Germany, 13 DICK. J. INVL L.
241, 265 (1995).
16. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
17. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
18. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
19. See id. at 48-49.
20. See id. at 51.
21. See id. at 53.
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prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
As an example of what speech the government may censure,
Holmes provided the following oft-quoted example: "The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. " '
Justice Holmes played a further role in establishing the
doctrine concerning inflammatory speech in his dissent to
Abrams v. United States.24 In opposing Abrams's conviction,
Holmes stated, "i]t is only the present danger of immediate
evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in
setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private
rights are not concerned. " ' It is important to read Holmes's
dissent contextually. His statement refers to the fact that
while Abrams supported the sovereignty of the Russian gov-
ernment, he did not advocate overthrowing the United States
government.2 6 Thus, Holmes thought that Abrams was only
prosecuted and convicted because he supported communism,
not because his words posed an immediate danger to the
safety of the United States.27  Holmes's "clear and present
danger" test was meant to prohibit the suppression of ab-
stract political ideas.
In his Abrams dissent, Holmes adopted the famous "mar-
ketplace of ideas" doctrine:
[M]en ... may come to believe even more than they be-
lieve the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is
the theory of our Constitution.28
Holmes based this doctrine on relativistic premises that he
22. Id. at 52.
23. Id.
24. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
25. Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 620.
27. See id. at 629-30 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly reaffirmed the rule that there is a constitutional difference between
mere advocacy of abstract theories justifying the use of violence and actual
preparations taken in furtherance of such theories. See, e.g., Note v. United
States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961).
28. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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espoused throughout his writings."
Justice Brandeis held the optimistic view that the dis-
semination of "more speech" would expose falsehoods and
fallacies and, thereby, avert evils." Abstract fears about fu-
ture harms, Brandeis argued, do not justify restricting free
speech.3 The drafters of the United States Constitution be-
lieved that liberties, such as the freedom to think and speak,
are essential for the elucidation of political truths and the
maintenance of happiness." "Recognizing the occasional tyr-
annies of governing majorities, [the founding fathers]
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly
should be guaranteed."" Suppression of speech is only justi-
fiable, Brandeis stated, when there is a "reasonable ground"
to believe that the danger of "serious evil' is imminent. 34 "It
is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination;
that fear breeds repression; repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and pro-
posed remedies." 5
Holmes clarified the type of truth he envisioned emerging
from the marketplace of ideas in his dissent in Gitlow v. New
York." Holmes argued that all ideas, especially eloquent
ones, are incitements because they move people to action or
inaction. 7 "If in the long run the beliefs expressed in prole-
tarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the domi-
nant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech
is that they should be given their chance and have their
way."8 Holmes thereby implicitly acknowledged and con-
doned the notion that free speech could establish a dominant
29. See infra text accompanying notes 283-307.
30. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring), overruled on other grounds, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
31. See id. at 376.
32. See id. at 375. Brandeis failed to mention that some of the very found-
ers who believed that liberty is both a moral end and a moral means also con-
doned slavery. See discussion infra Part III.C.
33. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 375. In a later opinion, the Court stated that the "wisest govern-
mental policies" result from open debate and dialogue. Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 502 (1951).
36. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 673.
38. Id.
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majority willing to repress other people's liberties. Holmes's
view contradicts Brandeis, who held that free speech is a
safeguard against, not a facilitator for, "tyrannies of govern-
ing majorities." 9 Holmes's views in Gitlow are consistent
with the relativistic philosophy he espoused throughout his
writings and which have influenced later court decisions."
While Holmes's dissent in Gitlow is often cited as indica-
tive of the Supreme Court's later First Amendment jurispru-
dence, the majority opinion in that case remains good law. In
his majority opinion, Justice Sanford recognized that the fu-
ture effect of violent rhetoric "cannot be accurately fore-
seen."' Therefore, the state may enact laws to protect "public
peace and safety" without having to "defer the adoption of
measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary
utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace orimminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it
may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened
danger in its incipiency."42 More recent cases dealing with the
freedom of expression have built on the foundations Holmes
and Brandeis established.
B. Contemporary Formulations of First Amendment
Doctrine
The Court announced its "fighting words" doctrine in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.4 The Supreme Court upheld
Chaplinsky's conviction for violating a statute that forbade
persons from using "offensive, derisive, and annoying" words
and "derisive" names against persons in public places."
Writing for the majority, Justice Murphy concluded that cer-
tain types of speech, such as "fighting words," are not, and
have never been, protected by the Constitution.45 Fighting
words are epithets reasonably expected to provoke a violent
reaction if addressed toward an "ordinary citizen."" "[Sluch
39. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
40. See infra Part IV.A; see also John C. Ford, Fundamentals of Holmes' Ju-
ristic Philosophy, 11 FORDHAM L. REv. 255, 264 (1942) (discussing Holmes's
view that "the essence of law is physical force, that might makes legal right").
41. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669.
42. Id.
43. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
4- Id. at 569 (reciting the relevant ordinance).
45. See id. at 571-72.
46. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
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utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality." 7
The interests of an entire racial group can be compro-
mised by false aspersions about the character of its members.
In 1952, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
group libel statute in Beauharnais v. Illinois." The legisla-
tion in question made it unlawful to "portray depravity,
criminality... or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any
race, color, creed, or religion" and to expose those citizens to
"contempt, derision, or obloquy." 9 The majority found that
based on Illinois' history of racial conflict, the legislature had
the power to punish group libel when it threatened "the peace
and well-being of the State."5" The Court upheld the defen-
dant's conviction for distributing lithographs urging white
homeowners to resist neighborhood integration.51 The Court
reasoned that since there was historical evidence that bigotry
had caused damages to the inhabitants of Illinois, the statute
was constitutional." The Court declared group libel not inte-
gral to the exposition of truth and damaging to the social fab-
ric.5" Since libel laws protect individuals from being harmed
and preserve social tranquility, the Court was "precluded
from saying that speech... cannot be outlawed if directed at
groups with whose position and esteem.., the affiliated indi-
vidual may be inextricably involved."54 While the Court ac-
knowledged the possibility of governmental abuse, it noted
that all laws can be abused and such a possibility was too re-
mote to find the law unconstitutional. 55
In Brandenburg v. Ohio," the Supreme Court enunciated
the current rule for determining whether a statute aimed at
limiting incitement infringes on individuals' First Amend-
ment rights. At issue was a film showing a speech by the de-
47. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
48. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
49. Id. at 252.
50. Id. at 258-59.
51. See id. at 252.
52. See id. at 254-63.
53. See id.
54. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 263.
55. See id.
56. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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fendant, the leader of an Ohio Ku Klux Klan chapter, assert-
ing that revenge might be taken against the United States
government if it "continues to suppress the white... race."57
Reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court held that the
First Amendment guarantee of free speech prohibits the gov-
ernment from proscribing the "advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to in-
citing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action."58 Further, the Court declared
the Ohio statute unconstitutional because it did not distin-
guish between persons calling for the immediate use of vio-
lence and those teaching an abstract doctrine about the use of
force.59 However, the Court failed to evaluate the historical
reasons why the Ku Klux Klan rally might have sparked rac-
ist conflict. Thus, its opinion that the speech would not incite
listeners to lawless action was not grounded on an empirical
foundation.
The most recent Supreme Court decision regarding limi-
tations on "pure bias" laws is R.AV. v. St. Paul.0 The major-
ity opinion in R.AV. differed substantially from the views of
the three concurring opinions. The case arose when several
teenagers placed a burning cross on a Black family's front
yard." The juveniles were charged under a St. Paul ordi-
nance that outlawed placing symbols-such as Nazi swasti-
kas or burning crosses-which were known to "arouse[] an-
ger, alarm or resentment on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender," in public or private places.62
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that the St.
Paul ordinance violated the First Amendment because it was
a form of "content discrimination."' The ordinance prohibited
only those "fighting words" enumerated in the law, while
other forms of potentially inflammatory utterances, such as
those about persons' political affiliations, were not pro-
57. Id. at 446. The film also depicted hooded persons setting fire to a cross
and carrying firearms. See id. at 445.
58. Id. at 447.
59. See id. at 448-49,
60. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
61 See id. at 379.
62. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990), cited in RA.V., 505 U.S.
at 380.
63. R. AV., 505 U.S. at 387.
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scribed. 4 While Scalia recognized the city's compelling inter-
est in protecting the human rights of the "members of groups
that have historically been subjected to discrimination,"' he
nevertheless held that such legislative intent could only be
constitutionally exercised by a total ban of all fighting words,
rather than focusing on hate speech.6" Scalia's view proclaims
laws specifically intended to prohibit inflammatory racist and
anti-Semitic utterances unconstitutional.
Justice White, in his concurring opinion to R.A.V., de-
cried the majority opinion as being contrary to Supreme
Court precedent." White argued that the Court had long al-
lowed the regulating of low-level speech based on its content.
It was disingenuous to require the government to regulate an
entire class of utterances (i.e., fighting words), but forbid
regulation of a subset of that class, which "by definition [is]
worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection." 8 Ac-
cording to Justice White, banning all or some fighting words
would help eliminate social harms, while not limiting the po-
tential for opinions to compete in the marketplace of ideas.9
The majority's approach "invites" persons to utilize racist ex-
pressions, which, in terms of the First Amendment, are
worthless.7"
Further, Justice White thought the majority's decision in
R.AV. would negatively influence future First Amendment
case law.71 The majority's opinion signaled to the dissemina-
tors of racial and ethnic animus that their expressions are
more worthy of governmental protections than the peace and
tranquility of the targeted groups. By calling the use of
fighting words a "debate," the majority placed hate speech on
the level of political and cultural discourse.73 Nevertheless,
Justice White held the ordinance unconstitutional because of
64. See id. at 391.
65. Id. at 395.
66. See id. at 394-95.
67. See id. at 401 (White, J., concurring).
68. Id.
69. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 401 (White, J., concurring). Justice White be-
lieved that the majority's decision ignored "the city's judgment that harms
based on race, color, creed, religion, and gender are more pressing public con-
cerns than the harms caused by other fighting words." Id. at 407.
70. See id. at 402.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
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its "overbreadth" in prohibiting expressions that hurt feel-
ings, caused offense, or produced resentment in others.74
Justice Blackmun, in a separate concurrence, agreed
with Justice White that the St. Paul ordinance was unconsti-
tutionally overbroad." However, Justice Blackmun declared
that it was generally constitutional for cities to enact laws
aimed at preventing hooligans from burning crosses intended
to drive minority residents from their homes.6
In yet another concurrence, Justice Stevens pointed out
that there are many constitutional, governmental regulations
that target utterances based on their content. For example, a
city can "prohibit political advertisements in its buses while
allowing other advertisements."77 Therefore, the majority's
contention that content-based regulations are unconstitu-
tional is not supported by First Amendment jurisprudence.78
Furthermore, Justice Stevens believed that just as a govern-
mental entity could constitutionally restrict only certain
forms of commercial speech, so too could St. Paul regulate
only certain types of fighting words and not others. 9 Ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, a city can regulate certain fighting
words based on the different social harms they cause. How-
ever, like Justices White and Blackmun, Justice Stevens
found that the St. Paul ordinance violated the First Amend-
ment because it was overbroad."
From the forgoing discussion, it is clear that the Supreme
Court has long held that the government cannot suppress
ideas it finds "offensive or disagreeable."' However, there is
also significant support for the view that restrictions on cer-
tain forms of hate speech are permissible given its low social
value.82 Before criticizing elements of the Supreme Court's
First Amendment doctrine' and suggesting legislative policy
74. See id. at 411.
75. See RAV., 505 U.S. at 416 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. See id. at 425.
79. See id. at 434.
80. See id. at 436.
81 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
82. For the views of several Supreme Court justices on this point, see R.A.V.
v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 377 (discussing First Amendment jurisprudence involv-
ing a form of hate speech, and including several concurring opinions).
83. See infra Part V.A.
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for restricting especially noxious hate speech,84 it is important
to evaluate some historically catastrophic consequences of
systematically repeated bigoted utterances.
III. HISTORICAL LESSONS ABOUT THE DANGERS OF HATE
SPEECH
Contrary to the Supreme Court's insistence that only ut-
terances leading to imminent lawless actions are dangerous,85
empirical evidence indicates that bigotry developed over an
extended period of time has led to crimes against humanity."
Expressed ideas about other members of the national com-
munity significantly influence peoples' perspectives on inter-
personal relations.87 Preconceived notions about outgroups
influence how they are treated.' Xenophobia is developed,
popularized, and spread by representing outgroup members
as symbols and representatives of evil, rather than as unique
persons.89 The persecution and/or total annihilation of out-
group members is, then, rationalized by the desire to rid soci-
ety of undesirable and deleterious members." The experi-
ences of Jews, Native Americans, and Blacks provide
important historical examples.
A. Dilatation of Anti-Semitism in Germany
Anti-Jewish sentiments existed in Germany since medie-
val times. It was then common lore that Jews poisoned wells,
caused the Black Death, and ritually murdered Christian
children.91 Germans considered Jews to be the enemies of
Christ and treated them as an outgroup.92 In fact, persecut-
84. See infra Part IV.D.
85. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
86. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 447.
87. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narra-
tives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 385 (1991).
88. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Ten Arguments Against Hate-
Speech Regulation: How Valid?, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 475, 478 (1996).
89. See Gavin I. Langmuir, Prolegomena to Any Present Analysis of Hostility
Against Jews, in 2 THE NAZI HOLOCAUST 153 (Michael R. Marrus ed., 1989).
90. See id.
91. See Lunabelle Wedlock, The Reaction of Negro Publications and Organi-
zations to German Anti-Semitism, 3 How. U. STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES 195,
201-02 (1942).
92. See J. L. Talmon, European History-Seedbed of the Holocaust, in 2 THE
NAZI HOLOCAUST, supra note 89, at 190. See generally JOSHUA TRACHTENBERG,
THE DEVIL AND THE JEWS: THE MEDIEVAL CONCEPTION OF THE JEW AND ITS
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ing Jews was considered a religious obligation.93 Myths about
Jewish insidiousness fueled pogroms 4 against them. For sev-
eral hundred years, stories spread about the Jews desecrating
the communal host.95 Hatred gnawed the German populace
until the latter myth culminated in a massacre of over three
thousand Jews between 1298 and 1301.96
During the Reformation, attitudes toward German Jews
did not improve. Martin Luther disseminated and developed
anti-Jewish sentiments.9 7  "Luther's anti-Semitism clearly
had a religious and not a racial foundation, but it cannot be
denied that it provided each successive Protestant generation
with.., sanction for animosity and persecution." Luther's
attitude toward Jews evolved from tolerance to animosity.99
Three years before his death, Luther advocated a fanatical
hatred of Jews. "First... set fire to their synagogues or
schools.""' "Second, I advise that their houses also be razed
and destroyed."' "Third, I advise that all their prayer books
and Talmudic writings... be taken from them."0 2 "Fourth, I
advise that their rabbis be forbidden to teach henceforth on
pain of loss of life and limb." ' 3 Luther further advised that
"they be forbidden on pain of death to praise God, to give
thanks, to pray, and to teach publicly among us and in our
country."' 4 Lutheran anti-Jewishness took medieval concepts
RELATION TO MODERN ANTISEMITISM (1943).
93. See Shmuel Ettinger, The Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism, in 2 THE
NAZI HOLOCAUST, supra note 89, at 180.
94. A pogrom is an organized and often officially supported "massacre or
persecution, especially one against Jews." AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY
1055 (3d ed. 1997).
95. See Ettinger, supra note 93, at 180, 189.
96. See id. at 179-208.
97. See RICHARD GUTTERmGE, OPEN THY MOUTH FOR THE DUMB! 3 (1976).
98. Id.
99. For a synopsis of the development of Luther's views, see 6 WILL
DURANT, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY OF EUORPEAN CIVIUZATION FROM
WYCLIF TO CALVIN 1300-1564, at 421-22 (1957) (citing Luther's 1520s publica-
tion, That Jesus Christ Was Born a Jew, to illustrate Luther's arguments for
merciful dealing with Jews).
100. 47 MARTIN LUTHER, On the Jews and Their Lies, in LUTHER'S WORKS:
THE CHRISTIAN IN SOCIETY IV 268 (Helmut T. Lehmann & Franklin Sherman
eds., Martin H. Bertram trans., Concordia Publ'g House 1971) (1543).
101. 47 id. at 269.
102. 47 id.
103. 47 id.
104. 47 id. at 286.
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a step further by ascribing an innate evil character to Jews.'
In the 1930s, when the Nazis first came to power, they justi-
fied many anti-Semitic laws and racial policies on the basis of
Luther's teachings."6
The enlightenment of the eighteenth century signaled a
departure from religious anti-Jewishness to an acceptance of
secular anti-Jewishness.1 7  Germans blamed Jews for con-
trolling economic and cultural life.' This line of thought de-
veloped into the myth that Jews secretly conspired to world
domination with the intent of persecuting non-Jews."
9 Anti-
Jewish hatred manifested itself in discriminatory laws, such
as those prohibiting Jews from settling in some German
towns and from practicing various professions."
0
In the late nineteenth century, the widespread negative
Jewish stereotypes made it possible to enlist social, religious,
and pseudo-intellectual support for discriminatory laws."'
Both the political right and left exploited contradictory views
about Jews to support their plans. In the 1850s, Wilhelm
Riehl expressed his contempt of Jews because he considered
them the proletariat of German society."' On the other hand,
105. See R. Po-Chia Hsia, The Usurious Jew: Economic Structure and Relig-
ious Representations in an Anti-Semitic Discourse, in IN AND OUT OF THE
GHETTO 161, 171 (R. Po-Chia Hsia & Hartmut Lehmann eds., 1995).
106. See LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945, at
23 (1975); see also Martha Sawyer Allen, Righting Old Wrong: Anti-Semitism of
Founder Disavowed by Lutherans, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 9, 1993, at 1. The Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church in America issued a statement rejecting Luther's anti-
Semitism. See id. It also recognized that Luther's words are still used by hate
groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Aryan Nation. See id.
107. This is not to say, however, that all German enlightenment thinkers
were anti-Jewish. For example, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing advocated Jewish
emancipation in GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING, NATHAN THE WISE (1779). See
ALFRED D. Low, JEWS IN THE EYES OF THE GERMANS 50-53 (1979). Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe also had positive things to say about Jews. See id. at 67-
71, 78.
108. See KARL D. BRACHER, THE GERMAN DICTATORSHIP 34 (Jean Steinberg
trans., 3d ed. 1972).
109. See id. The myth of a Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world was
most widely spread through the Russian forgery Protocols of the Elders of Zion
("Protocols"). See id. at 35. The year that Protocols was published in German, it
sold 120,000 copies. See DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 106, at 47.
110. See Todd M. Endelman, Comparative Perspectives on Modern Anti-
Semitism in the West, in 2 THE NAZI HOLOCAUST, supra note 89.
11L See BRACHER, supra note 108, at 34.
112. See Shulamit Volkov, Antisemitism as a Cultural Code: Reflections on
the History and Historiography of Antisemitism in Imperial Germany, in 1 THE
NAZI HOLOCAUST, supra note 89, at 319.
Marx claimed that Jews were at the root of capitalism."'
Marx therefore conceived of the proletariat revolution as the
"emancipation of society from Jewry." 114 Jews were, therefore,
the pariah of both extremes of German political thought.
Anti-Jewish thinkers developed and popularized expres-
sions to disseminate their worldview ("Weltanschauung"). In
1873, Wilhelm Marr coined the term Antisemitismus (anti-
Semitism) in his work, Der Sieg des Judentums iiber das
Germanentum (The Victory of Judaism over Germandom)."5
The term became a rallying cry for gathering individuals and
organizations into an ideological, social, and political camp."1 6
Otto von Glogau, a journalist, provided additional conceptual
framework for the widespread acceptance of Jew-hating in
the widely read periodical Die Gartenlaube (The Bower).1
7
During the 1870s, von Glogav used the linguistic casuistry of
blaming Germany's economic and social problems on the al-
leged Jewish domination of financial markets. 1 8 In 1887,
Paul de Lagarde, who became a hero of the anti-Semitic
movement, called for the seizure of all Jewish credit and
banking facilities. Moreover, Lagarde advocated the "exter-
mination" of Jews, whom he characterized as "germs," "para-
sites," and "vermin.""9 Some sixty years later, Hitler carried
out Lagarde's dogma to its lethal conclusion by urging Nazis
and their sympathizers to murder Jewish men, women, and
children. Nazis found Lagarde's ideology such an important
indoctrination tool that they distributed an anthology of his
works to German soldiers.2 0
What began as isolated bigotry became embedded in
popular German culture by the 1890s."' Many Reichstag
deputies argued that Jewish property should be confiscated
113. See KARL MARX, A WORLD WITHOUT JEWS (Dagobert D. Runes trans.,
Phil. Libr. 1959) (1843); see also Ettinger, supra note 93, at 224.
114. MARX, supra note 113, at 45.
115. See P.G.J. PULZER, THE RISE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEMITISM IN GERMANY
AND AUSTRIA 49 (1964).
116. See Volkov, supra note 112, at 320-21.
117. See id. at 321-22; see also BRACHER, supra note 108, at 38.
118. See Volkov, supra note 112, at 321-22.
119. PAUL DE LAGARDE, JUDEN UND INDOGERMANEN, cited in A. Bein, Mod-
ern Anti-Semitism and its Effect on the Jewish Question, 3 YAD WASHEM
STUDIES ON THE EUROPEAN JEWISH CATASTROPHE AND RESISTANCE 7, 14 n.19
(1959).
120. See FRITZ STERN, THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL DESPAIR 63 (1961).
121 See Volkov, supra note 112, at 325-26.
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and distributed to the German poor.122 By 1893, anti-Semitic
political parties had a sixteen-person faction in the Reich-
stag."i Anti-Semitic university organizations, such as the
Union of German Students and the Academic League of
Gymnasts, enjoyed popular support among students and pro-
vided a forum for spreading racism to intellectuals. 24 Librar-
ies contained extensive collections of anti-Semitic literature
for popular consumption.l" In sum, anti-Semitism permeated
Germany at the turn of the century.2
Animosity toward German Jews intensified after the first
World War.127 Jewish entrepreneurs were widely blamed for
the rise in inflation and shortages of vital goods. Those accu-
sations contributed to the periodic looting of Jewish busi-
nesses. 28 Evangelical preachers participated in blaming Jews
for Germany's postwar misfortunes.29 The repetitiveness of
those messages made development and implementation of the
Nazi exterminationist propaganda easier."'
The democracy of the post-World War I Weimar Republic
gave way to totalitarianism under Nazi rule. The Nazis often
built their anti-Semitic propaganda on slogans developed
decades beforehand. Julius Streicher, who published the
savagely anti-Semitic newspaper Der Stirmer,3' ordered that
122. Numerous theoreticians propounded this political position, including
Otto Bbckel who was elected a deputy of the Reichstag in 1887. See Ettinger,
supra note 93. Hermann Ahlwardt, who also called for the confiscation of Jew-
ish property, see id., was elected to the Reichstag in 1892, see DAWIDOWIcz, su-
pra note 106, at 41. Ahlwardt's anti-Semitic views were well known from his
book Despairing Struggle of the Aryan Peoples with Jewry, published in 1890.
See id.
123. See Ettinger, supra note 93, at 241.
124. See GUTrERIDGE, supra note 97, at 18. The vociferous anti-Semitic
campaign was not maintained by secular forces alone. Clergymen like Adolf
Stoecker, who was the Berlin Court and Cathedral Preacher in 1874, preached
that bloody attacks against Jews were unpreventable if they refused to relin-
quish supposed control of the German economy and politics. See id. at 4, 8.
125. See id.
126. See DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 106, at 45.
127. See id. at 59.
128. See DONALD L. NIEWYK, THE JEWS IN WEIMAR GERMANY 48 (1980).
129. See GUTTERIDGE, supra note 97, at 1; NIEWYK, supra note 128, at 55.
130. Although anti-Semitism was prevalent in pre-Nazi Germany, it did not
take on its lethal raiment until the Nazis systematized that ideology. Between
1919 and 1923, the anti-Semitic vote was never greater than eight percent of
the total. See NIEWYK, supra note 128, at 51.
131. By the 1930s, Streicher's newspaper was used as a teaching tool by ele-
mentary school teachers. See GUTTERIDGE, supra note 97, at 161-62.
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posters be raised throughout the Third Reich with the in-
flammatory message, "Die Juden sind unser Unglick" ("The
Jews are our misfortune"). This slogan was a verbatim re-
statement of the 1879 slogan of Heinrich von Treitschke, a
university professor who helped legitimize anti-Semitism in
intellectual circles.'33 Streicher's anti-Semitism can be traced
even further back in time. Before being sentenced to death by
hanging,' he "told the Nuremberg tribunal that Lu-
ther... had long before said what he himself had to say
about the Jews, and much more sharply."3 ' The Nazis devel-
oped and systematized animosity against Jews that had been
developing many years prior to the advent of the Third Reich.
The attempt to murder all Jews, the "Final Solution," be-
gan sometime in 1941;136 however, this plan was in the mak-
ing for years prior to its commencement. National Socialists
had advocated this goal before and after Hitler became Ger-
man Chancellor in 1933.1" On November 24, 1938, the SS pe-
riodical Schwarze Corps announced the plan to exterminate
(Ausrotten) and annihilate (Vernichtung) all Jews.'38 Moreo-
ver, Hitler told Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Chvalkov-
sky on January 21, 1939, "We are going to destroy the
Jews.-' 39
Hitler's diabolical plan and its implementation should be
compared with Luther's ominous directives of how to deal
with Jews. For example, Luther advocated burning syna-
gogues, 4' and nearly four hundred years after his pro-
nouncement, when ancient anti-Jewish sentiments were at
their apex, the Nazis and their sympathizers did just that.
During the night of November 9-10, 1938, known as Kristall-
nacht (Night of Broken Glass), frenzied crowds throughout
132. See BRACHER, supra note 108, at 37-38.
133. See Volkov, supra note 112, at 323-25.
134. See BRADLEY F. SMITH, REAcHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 200
(1977) (concerning Streicher's sentence).
135. GUTrERIDGE, supra note 97, at 315.
136. See DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 106, at 129.
137. The SA (Sturmabteilung), who were known as Hitler's storm troopers,
proudly sang a fighting song that proclaimed that when a SA "soldier comes un-
der fire / He feels courageous cheer / For when Jews' blood spurts from the
knife / Good times are once more here." NIEWYK, supra note 128, at 82.
138. See GUTTERIDGE, supra note 97, at 227.
139. Helmut Krausnick, The Persecution of the Jews, in ANATOMY OF THE SS
STATE 44 (Dorothy Long trans., 1968).
140. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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Germany-stirred on by years of anti-Semitic propaganda
that had become part of their psyche-set fire to a hundred
synagogues, destroyed shops and houses, raped Jewish
women, and killed Jews indiscriminately.14 ' Furthermore,
following Luther's ideas, the Nazis denied that Jews were
members of a distinct religion' and denied Jews the right to
practice Judaism.'
By the time the Nazis came to power, the malevolent vit-
riol that German leaders and thinkers spewed against Jews
had become deeply entrenched in German culture. The Nazis
were not elected in a cultural vacuum. Hitler could not have
come to power and guided the Final Solution without the
support and sadistic compliance of hundreds of thousands of
Germans. Years of anti-Semitic indoctrination prepared
Germans for Hitler's plan.'4 ' The most basic ethical princi-
ples, such as the one adjuring people not to kill innocent hu-
mans, were broken down by centuries of libel directed against
Jews. 5 Synagogue burnings, physical attacks against Jews,
and participation in mass deportations became acceptable for
Germans, in large part because prior anti-Semitic rhetoric
and systematic discrimination had dulled their consciences.
146
The German experience contradicts Supreme Court
opinions which concluded that only speech posing an immi-
nent threat of harm is dangerous enough to warrant statutory
censure.4 7 To the contrary, the most dangerous form of big-
otry takes years to develop, until it becomes culturally ac-
ceptable first to libel, then to discriminate, and finally to per-
secute outgroups. "[P]rolonged and intense verbal hostility
14L See WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 431
(1960).
142. Jews were designated "unbelievers" on June 12, 1941. See Chronology
of Laws and Actions Directed against Jews in Nazi Germany 1933-1945, in THE
HOLOCAUST YEARS 27 (Roselle Chartock & Jack Spencer eds., 1978). For Lu-
ther's proclamation that Jews should be forbidden the right to religious obser-
vance, see supra text accompanying note 104.
143. See DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 106, at 248.
144. See Talmon, supra note 92; see also DANIEL J. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S
WILLING EXECUTIONERS (1997) (discussing the critical and cruel role that ordi-
nary Germans played in the Holocaust).
145. See Talmon, supra note 92, at 200.
146. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 15 (3d ed.1979).
147. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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always precedes a riot."148 Just as in Germany, hate speech in
the United States was instrumental to the development of a
social psyche that justified inhuman treatment of outgroups.
The following section analyzes racism in the United States to
evaluate what effect, if any, hate speech against Native
Americans and Blacks had on the development of slavery and
the forceful expropriation of Native American lands.
B. Racist Speech and the Dislocation of Native Americans
Despite its history of republican democracy, the United
States has, at times, ignored and condoned hate speech pro-
moting a social psyche tolerant of persecuting outgroups. The
widespread acceptance and promulgation of verbal labels that
denied the worth and human equality of Native Americans
contributed to the government condoned injustices committed
against them.
Rather than investigate the differences among the nu-
merous tribes of indigenous peoples, colonists dubbed all the
native peoples as "savages."'49 Native Americans were persis-
tently described as deficient in European ways rather than as
possessing positive cultural norms of their own.50 The lin-
guistic framework, created by disregarding the native inhabi-
tants' unique cultures, made it easier for Europeans to deny
that Native Americans' shared a common humanity. 5' In-
stead of thinking of Native Americans as individuals pos-
sessing natural rights, colonists thought of them as a homo-
geneous group of savages. By denying their humanity and
asserting their inferiority, European settlers found it psycho-
logically and emotionally easier to violate Native Americans'
human rights with equanimity.'52 Europeans believed that
Native American religious worship was satanic and that
148. ALLPORT, supra note 146, at 60.
149. Native Americans were not called "Indians" until the seventeenth cen-
tury. See ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 13 (1979).
Some explorers in the sixteenth century used the term "inhabitants" rather
than savages. See id. at 14.
150. See id. at 26.
15L See LEWIS HANKE, ALL MANKIND IS ONE: A STUDY OF THE DISPUTATION
BETWEEN BARTOLOMf DE LAS CASAS AND JUAN Gnds DE SUPfiLVEDA IN 1550
ON THE INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS CAPACITY OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 85
(1974).
152. See HELEN CARR, INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRIMITIVE 56 (1996) (dis-
cussing the role of the term "savage" in "the evasion" of Native Americans'
rights).
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medicine men practiced sorcery.' Statements about Native
American morality alleged that Native Americans considered
lying and stealing ethical.'54 Voices of persons expressing
admiration for Native American culture, for the most part,
were disregarded and unheeded."'
In practical terms, conquerors and explorers used nega-
tive images of Native Americans to justify unlimited land
grabs.'56 Until the nineteenth century, Whites justified land
expropriations by claiming that civilized Whites had the right
to title over lands; on the other hand, the native "savages,"
who were thought to be merely hunters and gatherers, were
denied the right of ownership to their ancestral land.157 The
colonists argued that as hunters Native Americans had no
fixed ownership interests, but rather migrated with the
game.' This often repeated characterization blinded Ameri-
can social consciousness to the fact that some indigenous
tribes had developed farming to such an extent that they
helped pilgrims survive in the New World by teaching them
farming techniques.'59 Moreover, the United States govern-
ment justified taking land from Native Americans on the ba-
sis of racist claims of White superiority that developed
153. See Alexander Whitaker, reprinted in SAMUEL PURCHAS, HAKLUYTUS
POSTHUMUS OR PURCHAS HIS PILGRIMES 110 (James MacLehose and Sons
1906) (1613).
154. See id. Even Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain), who protested against the
institution of Black slavery in MARK TWAIN, HUCKLEBERRY FINN (1884), wrote
that Native Americans were indolent and habitual drunks. See MARK TWAIN,
ROUGHING IT 146-47 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1880).
155. William Penn, a Quaker and founder of the Pennsylvania colony, wrote
with interest about Native American languages, their family institutions, and
governments. See Letter from William Penn, Proprietary and Governour of
Pennsylvania in America to the Committee of the Free Society of Traders
(1683), in WHITE ON RED 50-54 (Nancy B. Black & Bette S. Weidman eds.,
1976) (1683). The great American statesman, Benjamin Franklin also wrote
about Native Americans with some admiration. He wrote that Native American
education was legitimate, although different, from that of the Europeans. See
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, The Savages of North America, in COMPLETE WORKS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 25-27 (John Bigelow ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons, The Knick-
erbocker Press 1888) (1784). More importantly for race relations, Franklin rep-
resented Native Americans as being friendly to their White neighbors rather
than as bloodthirsty savages. See id. at 30-31.
156. Explorers received title and jurisdiction over the land and people they
conquered. See BERKHOFER, supra note 149, at 126.
157. According to this conceptual framework, Indians were either going to
assimilate to White society or die off completely. See id. at 30.
158. See CARR, supra note 152, at 49.
159. See id.
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through the use of hate speech. Luke Lea, the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs from 1850-1853, typified this attitude:
When civilization and barbarism are brought in such rela-
tion that they cannot coexist together.., it is right that
the superiority of the former should be asserted and the
latter compelled to give way. It is, therefore, no matter of
regret or reproach that so large a portion of our territory
has been wrested from the aboriginal inhabitants and
made the happy abodes of an enlightened and Christian
people.1 60
Frontiersmen rationalized murdering Native Americans and
violating their property rights by drawing upon images of un-
enlightened and savage Indians. 6'
Popular utterances about Native Americans shaped the
views of English settlers. Using linguistic paradigms that
characterized Native Americans as barbarous, the settlers
committed inhumane and uncivilized acts against America's
indigenous peoples. An early example of the dangerous effect
of the colonists' conception of White superiority over Native
Americans was the Pequot War of 1637.162 Animosity arose
between the Connecticut settlers and the Pequots who pos-
sessed what is now central Connecticut.163 The War began as
revenge for the murder of a White trader by Pequot tribal
members."M However, the revenge perpetrated by the White
vigilantes was greatly disproportionate.' At the Mystic
River battle, the colonists set aflame wigwams, causing the
death of several hundred Pequots.'66 The colonists' hatred
160. FRANCIS P. PRUcHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 324 (Univ. of Neb. Press 1984)
(1852).
161. See BERKHOFER, supra note 149, at 148.
162. Some have argued that the Pequot War was not racially motivated since
white settlers enlisted the help of some Narraganset Indians. See RICHARD
DRINNON, FACING WEST 358-59 (1997). However this argument is not con-
vincing, and it is equivalent to arguing that because Custer employed Crow
scouts before the battle of Little Bighorn, he was not motivated by hatred for
Indians. See id. at 359.
163. See EDWARD CHANNING, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 402 (1926).
164. See 1 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
225-66 (1885).
165. But see Alden T. Vaughan, Pequots and Puritans: The Causes of the War
of 1637, 21 WM. & MARY Q. (1964) (arguing that the blame for the Pequot War
should be fairly equally allotted between the colonists, the Pequots, and sur-
rounding tribes).
166. See CHANNING, supra note 163, at 403.
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was so vehement that they continued military operations un-
til the Pequot nation ceased to exist.167 All but a few of the
remaining Pequots were sold into slavery." Those who com-
mitted the massacre were greeted as heroes after their
senseless carnage. 9
Life among the colonists did not, in many cases, improve
the lives of Native Americans. Tribes, like the Seminoles,
were forcibly relocated thousands of miles from their ances-
tral lands because they were not believed to have deep at-
tachment to those territories."' During times of war, re-
treating Indians were cruelly and unnecessarily slaughtered,
regardless of their genders and ages. 71  Characterizing
America's relations with Native Americans, Charles Francis
Adams 72 wrote, "the knife and the shotgun have been far
more potent and active instruments in dealings with the infe-
rior races than the code of liberty."
73
Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Johnson v.
M'Intosh T" acknowledged and maintained the disregard for
Native American human and property rights. In Johnson,
the Court addressed whether American Indians, specifically
the Illinois Piankeshaw nations, could convey land to private
individuals.175 The Court decided that Native Americans did
167. See id. at 403-04. After the Treaty of Hartford in 1638, which ended the
Pequot War, the Pequots were forbidden from returning to their villages or us-
ing their tribal name. See Mashantucket Pequot Museum & Research Center,
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation Timeline <http'/www.mashantucket.com/
handicap/tophome.html> (visited Aug. 23, 1999). Mashantucket Pequot Indi-
ans, who were descendants of the original Pequots, received tribal recognition
from the United States government on October 18, 1983. See id.
168. See 1 GEORGE B. TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 65 (1984).
169. See 1 BANCROFT, supra note 164, at 268.
170. See 1 TINDALL, supra note 168, at 405.
171. See 1 id. Such brutal actions were perpetrated against members of the
Sauk and Fox tribes during the Black Hawk War of 1832. See 1 id. The Black
Hawk War began when the Black Hawks returned to their lands, which they
had abandoned the year before to raise corn. See 1 id. The United States
Regular Army, commanded by Colonel Zachary Taylor, who later became the
twelfth President of the United States, unmercifully expelled the Black Hawks.
See DRINNON, supra note 162, at 198-99. Even Native Americans approaching
the Army with pacific signs were not spared a brutal death. See id. at 198.
172. Charles Francis Adams was an American historian and the grandson of
President John Quincy Adams.
173. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, "IMPERIALISM" AND "THE TRACKS OF OUR
FOREFATHERS" 16 (1899).
174. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
175. See id. at 571.
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not possess title to any land since they were roaming hunters,
not settled farmers."6 Marshall recognized that the United
States appropriated lands from Native Americans by con-
quest.177 He justified the conquest by reiterating the com-
monly accepted argument that, "the tribes of Indians inhab-
iting this country were fierce savages.., whose subsistence
was drawn chiefly from the forest."178 Rather than leaving the
land a wilderness and allowing indigenous people to retain
their liberty, the Europeans enforced their "pompous
claims... by the sword."'79 In his decision, Marshall recog-
nized that the United States expansionist policy was "opposed
to natural right[s]," 80 but he nevertheless held that Indians
only had a possessory, but not fee simple, interest in the land
they occupied. The accepted "legitimizing narratives"8' and
linguistic paradigms used by Whites to justify their cruelties
against the aboriginal peoples of North America caused even
great thinkers like Marshall to argue that Native Americans
had less claims to basic human rights than their White coun-
terparts.
As with the widely distributed Nazi stereotypes of Jews,
American stereotypes of Native Americans served as the
groundwork for claims of superiority. Repeated messages
about the inferiority of Native Americans and Jews were later
instrumental for carrying out racist policies. The hate propa-
ganda regarding Jews in Germany and Native Americans in
the United States provided a conceptual framework for sys-
tematic, widespread oppression. Although the persecutions
experienced by these two groups were significantly different,
in both cases racist utterances significantly contributed to
discrimination and destruction.
C. Language and the Institution of Slavery
Like the theories of Jewish and Native American inferi-
ority, pseudo-scientific views about the inferiority of Blacks'82
176. See id. at 590-91, 604-05.
177. See id. at 589-90.
178. Id. at 590.
179. Id.
180. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591.
181. SUSAN SCHECKEL, THE INSISTENCE OF THE INDIAN 27 (1998).
182. This article uses the term Blacks rather than the currently popular
Afro-Americans or African-Americans because the latter terms are both over-
and underinclusive. They are overinclusive because they include persons like
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played a significant role in their oppression.'83 Unfortunately,
only a few historical sources detailing the evolution of hate
propaganda against Blacks and its effect upon their enslave-
ment are available."M Nevertheless, sufficient information
exists to piece together the role hate speech played in justi-
fying the institutionalization of hereditary servitude. Specifi-
cally, viewing Blacks as a sub-species of humans, mentally in-
ferior, and savage, perpetuated and supported American
slavery.
Discrimination against Blacks developed among Europe-
ans even before they systematized Black slavery.8 ' "When
slavery did become embodied in law, it could not help but re-
flect the folk bias within the framework of which it devel-
oped."8 6 Europeans and American colonists used racial dog-
mas to justify the subjugation of Blacks.'87 Just as the
exploitation of Native Americans manifested elements of bar-
barism present in European culture, the Black slave trade
was a vestige of ancient despotism that continued to sway
European minds in spite of philosophical, political, and cul-
tural advances. Blacks were considered little better than
animals, as evidenced by the unsanitary, despicably cramped,
and often lethal conditions that they endured during trans-
port from Africa through the Middle Passage.'88 Blacks were
transported and fed like livestock because slave traders did
not think them worthy of human amenities.' Considering
White South Africans, whose ancestors were never persecuted in the United
States or anywhere else. They are underinclusive because they do not include
persons, such as the indigenous people of Papua New Guinea whose character-
istics resemble people of African ancestry and who could, therefore, be targeted
by racists.
183. See Wedlock, supra note 91, at 205 (comparing Jewish and Negro stereo-
types).
184. See WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 44 (1968).
185. See CARL N. DEGLER, OUT OF OUR PAST 30 (1959). Compare Oscar
Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, The Origins of Negro Slavery, in THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN SLAVERY AND RACISM 21 (Donald L. Noel ed., 1972) (1950).
186. DEGLER, supra note 185, at 30.
187. See Wedlock, supra note 91, at 203.
188. See Gustavus Vassa, The Life of Olaudah Equiano, the African, in
GREAT DOCUMENTS IN BLACK AMERICAN HISTORY 47 (George Ducas ed., Prae-
ger Publishers 1970) (1789). The cruelty of this trip from freedom to slavery is
comparable to the cruelty with which Nazis shipped Jews to death camps in cat-
tle cars containing no food or water. See BEREL WEIN, TRIYMPH OF SURVIVAL
368-69 (1990).
189. See 1 DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF THE SLAVE TRADE
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Blacks a different species from themselves, slave traders had
no scruples about ignoring the emotional sufferings inflicted
upon captive Blacks separated forever from their family
members.190
In late seventeenth century New England, Puritans ar-
gued that slavery was the best means for converting Blacks to
Christianity."' In 1701, John Saffin claimed that inequality
of the races was part of the divine world order.'92 Other Puri-
tans justified the suppression of human rights by drawing
upon biblical verses, which they argued damned "heathen"
souls to hell.193 As Blacks began converting to Christianity,
the language of inferiority changed from religious assertions
to secular ones, purporting Blacks to be innately defective in
character and mentally inferior.' This linguistic framework
gave further justification for retaining slavery.99 During the
colonial period of American history, Whites often spoke about
the inferior spiritual capacity of Blacks.'96 Further, colonial
Americans regarded Blacks as members of a different spe-
cies."'97 The development of pseudo-scientific ethnology gave
the theories of black inferiority an air of intellectual accept-
ability. For example, Dr. Samuel Cartwright wrote that
Blacks were members of a sub-human species that resembled
TO AMERICA 129 (Elizabeth Donnan ed., Carnegie Institution of Washington
1930). The subhuman treatment of Blacks transported to be slaves is evident in
a letter from the Guinea Company to Bartholomew Haward, dated December 9,
1651: "put aboard you so many negers as yo'r ship can cary and for what shalbe
wanting to supply the Cattel, as also to furnish you with victualls and provi-
sions for the said negers and Cattel." 1 id.
190. See Vassa, supra note 188, at 41, 42, 43-44, 50-51 (discussing how the
author was forcefully separated from his family).
19L See WILLIAM S. JENKINS, PRO-SLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH 7
(Peter Smith 1960) (1935).
192. See id. at 5.
193. See LORENZO J. GREENE, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND
1620-1776, at 61-62 (1942). Religious justifications for enslaving Blacks con-
tinued to be effective for gaining popular Southern support for slavery. See, e.g.,
ALEXANDER MCCAINE, SLAVERY DEFENDED FROM ScRrTURE AGAINST THE
ATTACKS OF THE ABOLITIONISTS (W.M. Wooddy 1842); A Southern Clergyman, A
Defence of Southern Slavery against the Attacks of Henry Clay and Alex'r
Campbell, in A DEFENSE OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND OTHER PAMPHLETS (Ne-
gro Univ. Press 1969) (1831).
194. See OSCAR REISS, BLACKS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 98(1997).
195. See JORDAN, supra note 184, at 494.
196. See JENKINS, supra note 191, at 8.
197. See, e.g., J. H. Van Evrie, Negroes and Negro Slavery, in THE BURDEN
OF RACE 105 (Gilbert Osofsky ed., Harper & Row 1968) (1853).
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monkeys.9 Edward Long, in his book History of Jamaica,
argued that Blacks were closely linked to apes.199 Therefore,
race supremacists argued, Whites had the "imperative duty
devolving on the superior race" to subordinate Blacks."'0
More sophisticated arguments were also used to justify
slavery. At a debate held at the 1773 commencement of Har-
vard University, one of the interlocutors argued that slavery
was ethically justifiable based on act utilitarian °1 and racial
superiority grounds.0 2 The speaker took it as axiomatic that
the happiness of the community members was the epitome of
social accomplishments.' From this premise, he reasoned
that it was ethical for the majority to increase their welfare
and liberties by diminishing the freedoms of minority
UUS204
groups.2°
Other rhetoricians argued that slavery was a "positive
good." Some who supported this position were in the upper
echelons of political power. William Grayson, who served in
the United States Congress, argued that slavery subdued
Blacks' "savage heart."2 5 Vice President John C. Calhoun be-
lieved that slave owners improved the lives of Blacks who
otherwise would be "low, degraded and savage."0 6
The English linguistic paradigm that formed the concep-
tual framework supporting slavery was highly evolved by the
Civil War. Despite the utter incompatibility of slavery to the
198. See Samuel Cartwright, Natural History of the Prognathous Species of
Mankind, in SLAVERY DEFENDED: THE VIEWs OF THE OLD SOUTH (Eric L. McKi-
trick ed., Prentice-Hall 1963) (1857).
199. See JORDAN, supra note 184, at 491-94.
200. Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
201. For an elucidation about the basic principles of utilitarianism, see
ROBIN BARROW, UTITARIANISM (1991).
202. See A FORENSIC DISPUTE ON THE LEGALITY OF ENSLAVING THE
AFRICANS (1773) (photocopy on file with Santa Clara Law Review).
203. See id. at 9.
204 See id. at 7. Contrary to the foregoing act utilitarian argument, rule
utilitarianism holds that the reduction of happiness of any members of society,
whether they be part of the majority or minority, reduces the happiness of the
whole. See Alexander Tsesis, Toward a Just Immigration Policy: Putting Ethics
into Immigration Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 105, 129-34 (1999).
205. William J. Grayson, The Hireling and the Slave, in SLAVERY DEFENDED,
supra note 198, at 64. Grayson also argued that Blacks were thrifty so long as
they were slaves, but, if freed, they would turn to theft. See id. at 61. Grayson
served in the United States Congress.
206. WILLLAM L. KATZ, EYEWITNESS: THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN HISTORY 95
(1974).
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United States Constitution's protections of liberties,2 7 hate
propaganda against Blacks was widely believed in
antebellum United States.
Shortly before the Civil War, Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice Taney wrote the majority opinion in the infamous Dred
Scott case and explained his decision by stating that Blacks
were "a subordinate and inferior class of beings."28 He reiter-
ated and reinforced the view that Blacks were "so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be re-
duced to slavery for his benefit."29 Thus, from the days of
slave trading to the Civil War era, repeated racist classifica-
tions of Blacks played a significant role in their subrogation.
D. Bigotry in Contemporary United States Society
Several dangerous trends in the contemporary United
States indicate the need for restricting the type of hate speech
that is intended to elicit violent and inhumane acts against
outgroups. This section addresses hate speech on the Inter-
net, the role of hate speech in recent crimes, and the emer-
gence of hate speakers in political organizations.
1. Internet and Hate Speech
Modern technology makes the transmission of ideas eas-
ier. The Internet is increasingly becoming a channel for the
dissemination of hatred. The Simon Wiesanthal Center found
approximately fifty hate groups with their own electronic
bulletin boards on the Internet in 1995.210 The neo-Nazi Na-
tional Alliance, White Aryan Resistance, the Ku Klux Klan
("KKK"), and Aryan Crusaders use the Internet to dissemi-
nate their messages."' Hate groups distribute their messages
207. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V.
208. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856).
209. Id. at 407. Justice Curtis's dissent to Dred Scott, which was readily
available in the marketplace of ideas, did not bring the Court, nor the Confed-
eracy, any closer to adopting the truth about the cruelty of slavery.
210. See Steve Barmazel, There Is No Stopping Hate Speech, 15 CAL. L. REV.
41 (1995).
211. See id.; see also Mark Mueller, Hate Groups Spewing Venom on Net,
BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 15, 1996, at 1. Other hate groups with their own Inter-
net sites include Stormfront (found at <http://www.stormfront.org>), which con-
tinues to promote the concept that Blacks are racially inferior and supports Na-
tional Socialism; Aryan Nation (found at <http"/www.christian-
aryannations.com>), which provides a biased look at Jewish teachings in the
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through the Internet to a quantitatively greater and qualita-
tively more diverse audience than had previously been possi-
ble.212 By 1999, there were at least eight hundred Internet
sites promoting hate and targeting "religious groups, visible
minorities, women and homosexuals."'
The Southern Poverty Law Center monitors the Internet
sites of hate groups, including information about militia or-
ganizations preparing their members for a race war through
Internet propaganda.214 Many of those calling for a race war
consider the Internet an important vehicle for accomplishing
their goals."5
Software filters such as CyberPatrol, NetNanny,
SurfWatch, and HateFilter allow parents to prevent their
children from accessing Internet sites advocating hate
against identifiable groups.216 These filters are beneficial for
preventing the most vulnerable segment of United States so-
ciety-children-from being influenced by bigotry. However,
those filters are not definitive solutions to the potential dan-
gers. The fiters do not prevent unstable adults from access-
ing those hate-filled Internet sites to draw ideological suste-
nance, feed and further tantalize their bigotry, and inflame
their already volatile passions against outgroups. Instead of
voluntary purchases and installations of commercial prod-
ucts, state and federal laws preventing dangerous forms of
hate speech are necessary to protect individual rights and so-
cial welfare.
Talmud and uses Biblical passages to justify its belief that Blacks are "beasts";
and White Aryan Resistance (found at <http-//www.resist.com>), which adver-
tises its magazine "WAR, White Aryan Resistance."
212. See Barmazel, supra note 210, at 41.
213. Louise Surette, New Laws To Curb Hate on Internet?: Symposium Urges
Federal Action, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Mar. 24, 1999, at A12.
214. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Intelligence Project (visited Apr. 1,
2000) <http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceprojectlip-index.html>. Driving
these movements is "the Christian Identity religion, a virulently anti-Semitic
and racist theology." Id.
215. See id.
216. See Michael Krantz, Censor's Sensibility; Are Web Filters Valuable
Watchdogs or Just New Online Thought Police?, TIME, Aug. 11, 1997, at 48; see
also Robert Gearty, Filter Bars Web Hate, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 12, 1998, at
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2. The Instigation of Hate Crimes
The proliferation of hate material over the Internet is
only partially responsible for recent hate crimes. Hate mes-
sages typically precede violent hate crimes. The World
Church of the Creator" is an organization that spreads hate
propaganda through the Internet, pamphlets, and television
interviews.218 It calls on its members to participate in a racial
holy war."' One the World Church of the Creator's disciples,
Benjamin Smith, recently acted on its doctrine, murdering a
Black man and an Asian man, as well as wounding nine
Jews."'2 Smith made his dangerous intent known in an inter-
view given just weeks before the shooting."' "To want to live
in a world where blacks have power over whites, where Jews
are in control, I think that's a sickness and I'd like to eradi-
cate that sickness. In some ways it's inevitable-racial holy
war."22 Under current First Amendment jurisprudence,2" the
government could not have charged Smith with a crime for
those utterances because they did not pose an imminent
threat of harm. Had Smith's words been actionable, based on
his manifest intent to harm Blacks and Jews at some later
time, his lethal actions may have been deterred.
Just as Smith announced his deadly intent before com-
mitting the hate crimes, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris also
made their nefarious intents known before the bloody attack
against their fellow students in Littleton, Colorado.2 4 Kiebold
and Harris planned their shooting spree to coincide with
Adolf Hitler's birthday, and they rehearsed it on a video they
showed to their fellow students several months before the
217. Matthew Hale, leader of the World Church of the Creator, was recently
denied a license to practice law by the Supreme Court of Illinois due to his
overtly racist views. See Rob Stafford, Dateline: The Practice; A Vowed Racist
Fights Denial of License to Practice Law in Illinois, (NBC television broadcast,
Feb. 15, 1999) (transcript on file with Santa Clara Law Review).
218. See Michael A. Fletcher, Behind the Hate: A Racist "Church" Linked to
Violent Plots and Murder, WASH. POST, July 6, 1999, at A8.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221 See Smith on Video: Racial Holy War Inevitable, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 7, 1999, at State and Regional Section.
222. Id.
223. See supra Part H.
224. See Ellen O'Brien & Lynda Gorov, School Killings Plotted in Diary; Con-
spirators Timed Massacre to Occur on Hitler's Birth Date, Colorado School
Shootings, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 1999, at Al.
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murders.2 5 The depictions on the video did not constitute an
imminent threat of lawless action,226 because they were re-
corded several months before the murders. Nevertheless, the
danger was real. The video provided a warning sign of future
lawless actions, but under current First Amendment juris-
prudence its transmission was not punishable because the
danger depicted was not "imminent."
22 7
The bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
on April 19, 1995, provides another recent example of a trag-
edy that might have been avoided by enforcement of a statute
prohibiting hate speech. William Pierce's depiction of the
bombing in his racist novel, The Turner Diaries,228 influenced
the bomber, Timothy McVeigh. 9 If Pierce intended his book
to be a blue print to that deadly action, he might have been
prohibited by statute from distributing the menacing book,
and the deaths of 168 people might then have been avoided.
Hate speech also played a role in the murder of James
Byrd, Jr."0 John William King and two friends chained Byrd
to a truck, dragged him for several hundred feet, and left him
for dead. 1 King, who was sentenced to death by lethal injec-
tion, and one of his co-defendants adopted white supremacist
ideology while serving sentences for different crimes in a local
jail.Y In prison, the two men joined a gang called the Con-
federate Knights of America, a chapter of the KfK 233 Hate
developed gradually in these men, until the racism they
heard ignited into a racially inspired, brutal murder.
225. See Paul Schwartzman, A Lot of Signs Were Given-But Ignored, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 25, 1999, at 4.
226. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the
First Amendment guarantees of free speech prohibit government from pro-
scribing the "advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action").
227. See supra Part II.
228. WILLIAM L. PIERCE, THE TURNER DIARIES (Barricade Books 1978).
229. See Doreen Carvajal, Group Tries to Halt Selling of Racist Novel, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1996, § 1, at 8. Pierce is leader of National Alliance, a West
Virginia white supremacist group. See id.
230. See Adam Cohen, A Life for a Life: As America Watches, a Texas Town
Searches for Racial Healing After a Grisly Murder Trial, TIME, Mar. 8, 1999, at
28.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
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The dissemination of fallacies about the history and
characteristics of identifiable outgroups has contributed to
the rise of hate crimes in the United States. While in the
past, hate speech led to mob violence and the lynching of
Blacks, more recently, hate speech inflamed racists into a
spate of Black church burnings.' Before the conflagration of
Macedonia Baptist Church, the KK posted a paper on the
doors of the church warning that the "KKK-is watching
you." 5 A court subsequently ordered the KK to pay $37.8
million to the Church, after a jury determined that the KKK
stirred up hatred "that led to the burning" of the "predomi-
nantly black church.""6
The spread of hate propaganda desensitizes people to the
tragic consequences of bigotry. Although the Holocaust oc-
curred just half a century ago, already there is a pseudo-
intellectual movement denying that Jews were systematically
murdered by Nazis." Nationally known figures, such as
presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan and Nation of Islam
leader Louis Farrakhan, have expressed their disbelief that
Nazis tried to commit genocide against the Jews. 8 The dis-
semination of this view by influential figures has infected the
thoughts of ordinary Americans. According to a 1993 poll,
twenty-two percent of the United States adult population
thought that "it seemed possible the Holocaust never hap-
pened," and another twelve percent did not know if the Holo-
caust was possible. 9
234. See Charles J. Ogletree Jr., The Limits of Hate Speech: Does Race Mat-
ter?, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 491, 504-05 (1997).
235. Marlon Manuel, Neo-Nazis Next Target of Lawyer Who Broke Klan,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 5, 1999, at 1C.
236. Chris Burritt, Klan Role in S.C. Arson Costs It $37.8 Million, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., July 25, 1998, at 1A.
237. See Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment: The
Quest for Truth in a Free Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35 (1997) (concerning
the Holocaust denial made by Northwestern University Professor Arthur Butz).
Professor Butz's Holocaust revisionism is broadcast on the Internet at the ex-
pense of Northwestern University. See Geri J. Yonover, Anti-Semitism and
Holocaust Denial in the Academy: A Tort Remedy, 101 DIcK. L. REv. 71, 75
(1996). In 1990, a professor at Indiana University taught that the Holocaust is
a "myth." Id. at 76.
238. See Lasson, supra note 237, at 79.
239. Michiko Kakutani, Critic's Notebook; When History is a Casualty, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1993, at C1.
75920001
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
3. Hate Speech in Political Organizations
In recent years, white supremacists have pursued influ-
ential jobs in the judicial and legislative branches of govern-
ment to propagate their racist and anti-Semitic ideas. Some
current members of the United States Congress support an
overtly racist organization. Representative Robert L. Barr Jr.
of Georgia was once the keynote speaker at a gathering of the
Council of Conservative Citizens ("CCC).24o The CCC rejects
interracial marriages as being a form of "white genocide,"24'
argues that Blacks are mentally inferior,242 has close connec-
tions with David Duke,243 and regularly engages in racist and
anti-Semitic rhetoric.2 Barr has used his congressional
power to oppose hate crime legislation, additional funds for
social programs, and the continuation of civil rights protec-
tions. 5 In recent years, the Senate Majority Leader, Trent
Lott, also attended and spoke at many CCC dinners and ral-
lies.246 Despite Lott's denial of knowledge about CCC's big-
oted views, Arnie Watson, a member of the CCC's executive
board and former Mississippi State Senator, said, "Trent is an
honorary member."247 Within the last two years, Mississippi
Governor Kirk Fordice was the keynote speaker at the CCC's
semi-annual national convention where he and others stood
to sing "Dixie" and then sat during the rendition of "My
Country, 'Tis of Thee."2" The participation of high ranking
politicians lends the CCC's brand of bigotry an air of respect-
ability, and makes it more acceptable among their constitu-
ents.
Bigotry in the United States is not confined to white su-
premacists. Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan, organ-
240. See Thomas B. Edsall, Barr Spoke to White Supremacy Group, WASH.
POST, Dec. 11, 1998, at A23.
241. Id.
242. See Daryl Lease, Hate Group with Local Origins Makes National News
SARASOTAHERALD-TRIB., Mar. 1, 1999, at 8A.
243. See Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Viewpoint, Bob Barr: The Point Man for a
Civil War, NEWSDAY, Dec. 28, 1998, at A30. David Duke is a former KKK
Grand Dragon.
24{ See Hugh B. Price, Commentary, To Be Equal; White-Collar Ku Klux
Klan, COPELY NEWS SERV., Jan. 20, 1999.
245. See Hutchinson, supra note 243, at A30.
246. See Price, supra note 244.
247. John Kifner, Lott, and Shadow of a Pro-White Group, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1999, at A9.
248. See id.
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izer of the "Million Man March," has grown in popularity in
the Black community.249 There are numerous similarities be-
tween white supremacist ideology and Farrakhan's ideology.
The Final Call, the official newspaper published by the Na-
tion of Islam, contains separatist, non-democratic ideology.
At the end of each issue of The Final Call is a list of the Na-
tion of Islam's demands and wishes. Among these is the fol-
lowing: "We want our people in America whose parents or
grandparents were descendants from slaves, to be allowed to
establish a separate state or territory of their own-either on
this continent or elsewhere."25 Such ideas closely resemble
those of David Duke and the KKK, which also advocate the
view that Whites and Blacks should live separately because of
their innate incompatibilities." 1 Wanting to return to the
days of "separate but equal" education, 2 The Final Call ar-
gues for "equal education-but separate schools up to 16 for
boys and 18 for girls .... We want all Black children edu-
cated, taught and trained by their own teachers."253 The Na-
tion of Islam's prohibition against intermarriage among races
strikes an ominous and fascist tone."
The main targets of the Nation of Islam's bigotry are
Jews. Farrakhan describes Judaism as a "gutter religion " "u
249. According to one poll, 48.8% of Blacks think favorably of Farrakhan.
See Adam Dickter, Mixed Messages on Blacks and Jews: Poll Shows Agreement
on Need to Silence Haters, Though Farrakhan Still a Favorite; Martin Luther
King III Pledges to Combat Anti-Semitism, JEWISH WEEK, May 1, 1998, at 8.
250. The Muslim Program, THE FINAL CALL, Mar. 16, 1999.
251. See Duke Seeks Ex-Rep. Livingston's Seat, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 1999, at
23 ("[David] Duke... has written a new book that calls for separate nations for
whites and blacks.").
252. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding law that pro-
vided "separate but equal accommodations" for Whites and Blacks on railroad),
overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segre-
gating school children exclusively because of their race violates the Equal Pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
253. The Muslim Program, supra note 250.
254. See id. ("We believe that intermarriage or race mixing should be prohib-
ited.").
255. David L. Schaefer, Commentary, Farrakhan's Vilifying Videos Don't Be-
long in High School Classrooms, TELEGRAM & GAzETrE, Mar. 27, 1998, at All;
The Farrakhan Show, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1984, at A23. In 1998, Farrakhan
delivered a speech in Detroit, which the Anti-Defamation League characterized
as "shockingly anti-Semitic," saying Jews control the United States government.
See George Bullard, Farrakhan Speech Angers Jewish Leader, DET. NEWS, Nov.
17, 1998, at D7.
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and has called Hitler "a great man."56 On a more dangerous
note, Farrakhan "promised to 'grind' Jews and 'crush them
into little bits."'257 Khalid Abdul Muhammad, one of Farra-
khan's aids, ranted that Jews are the "blood-suckers of the
black nation."58 Kweisi Mfume, then President of the Con-
gressional Black Caucus and the current President of the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
said that Abdul Muhammad's speech had the same "'tone of
intolerance' that allowed slavery and the Holocaust to hap-
pen."" While the mainstream Black leadership regularly
speaks out against anti-Semitism," Farrakhan's hateful vit-
riol strengthens anti-Semitic attitudes festering in the Black
inner city.26' University students have also been charmed by
the charisma of these known anti-Semites.26
Unlike the United States, Canadian criminal law permits
the prosecution of the Nation of Islam leaders for derisive
comments about an identifiable group (i.e., Jews).263 On July
9, 1998, the Hate Crime Unit of the Toronto Police began in-
vestigating whether the Nation of Islam in Toronto violated
section 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code, which prohibits
advocating hatred against identifiable groups based on their
color, race, religion, or ethnic origin 4 The United States
should impose similar laws to deter the Nation of Islam from
256. Schaefer, supra note 255, at All.
257. Id.
258. Kevin Merida, Black Leaders Call on Farrakhan to Repudiate Contro-
versial Remarks by Aide, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1994, at A3 (describing the
comments of Abdul Muhammad during a speech at Kean College in 1994).
259. Id.
260. For example, Julian Bond, Chairman of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), recently discussed the importance
of strengthening the relationship between Blacks and Jews at the Anti-
Defamation League's Annual Leadership Conference. See New NAACP Head
Seeks to Improve Weathered Black/Jewish Relations, JACKSONVILLE FREE
PRESS, Apr. 15, 1998, at 2. At a conference held at Yeshiva University, Martin
Luther King III spoke out against racism and anti-Semitism stating that, "Even
passive toleration of anti-Semitism serves the evils of prejudice and bigotry my
father fought against." Dickter, supra note 249, at 8.
261. See Frank Eltman, More Blacks Found To Be Anti-Semitic, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 24, 1998. A 1998 Anti-Defamation League study found that 34% of
Blacks harbored anti-Semitic views, as compared to only 9% of Whites holding
such views. See id.
262. See Lasson, supra note 237, at 39-40.
263. See Islam and the Farrakhan "Nation," TORONTO STAR, July 9, 1998, at
A22.
264. See id.
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making inflammatory remarks that could ignite a conflagra-
tion, threatening the peace and tranquility of United States
citizens and democratic institutions.
While bigotry remains outside of mainstream United
States society, many groups develop followings through their
continued use of hate speech. The historical examples dis-
cussed in Parts II.A, II.B, and I1.C indicate that the smol-
dering embers of hate speech are dangerous not only immedi-
ately, but also often after years of relative quiescence.
Therefore, to wait until a clear and present danger of violent
actions actualizes is to blind society to the empirical lessons
of the past. This article demonstrates that widespread dis-
semination of bigotry has been the springboard for discrimi-
nation that has led to separation, persecution, oppression, en-
slavement, and genocide."6 5 Ignoring history's lessons could
threaten America's constitutional form of egalitarianism.
This downward spiral is not, however, inevitable. It can be
prevented by laws prohibiting hate speech aimed at violating
outgroups' civil rights. Such laws can maintain domestic
tranquility, while helping to prevent widespread, volatile, ra-
cial and ethnic violence.
IV. PREVENTING VIOLENT BIGOTRY
Historical evidence indicates that hate speech threatens
liberty and democracy even when there is no imminent threat
of harm at the time of dissemination.266 Hate speech is criti-
cal to the development of cultural norms that permit, advo-
cate, and justify violent acts against outgroups.267 The issue
then arises of whether Supreme Court precedents should be
reconsidered based on this empirical evidence. A fresh ap-
proach to First Amendment jurisprudence should manifest
awareness about the cultural diversity of the people cohabit-
ing in the United States.
The United States is a multifarious quilt of different ra-
cial, ethnic, religious, and national groups where hate speech
can promote inter-group animosity.2" Cultural differences
265. See ALLPORT, supra note 146, at 57; see also supra Parts III.A-C.
266. See supra Part III.
267. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2357 (1989).
268. See Note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 595, 595 (1947).
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strengthen society by providing unique perspectives about the
empirical world and human relationships. When orators, es-
pecially those with a following, begin speaking of purging so-
ciety of its diversity, the potential for discrimination and per-
secution against outgroups arises.269 Speakers can incite
persons receptive to racial hatred to commit hate crimes by
using historical stereotypes about the depravity or inferiority
of outgroups." Hate crimes are not perpetrated in a psycho-
logical and social vacuum. Averse oratory against outgroups
with the explicit intent to harm can inflame persons to violent
actions.271  Hate speech reinforces existing negative stereo-
types or provides the false information necessary to create
new ones.2  The intensification and development of prejudice
is a social evil that threatens harmonious democracy.
3
Hate speech legislation should prohibit utterances in-
tended to stir individuals or groups to oppress. Such legisla-
tion can prevent active discrimination.274 The mere possibility
that a hate speech statute could be abused is insufficient to
gainsay its potential to benefit a multi-ethnic and multi-racial
society.275 All criminal laws can be abused, but that does not
lead to the conclusion that anarchy is the best alternative.
Based on the effectiveness of other anti-discrimination stat-
utes, it is plausible to think that laws prohibiting hate speech
may likewise reduce ethnic and racial animosity.2 6 Hate
speech laws' potential to safeguard human rights outweighs
the interest of bigots in spreading their false stereotypes
about outgroups. In short, legislation aimed at preventing
hate speech may reduce bigoted violence before more innocent
lives are lost.
77
269. See Miri Rubin, Imagining the Jew: The Late Medieval Eucharistic Dis-
course, in IN AND OUT OF THE GHETTO, supra note 105, at 178.
270. See id.
271. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 463.
272. See id. at 462.
273. See id.
274. Even the potential of criminal punishment may deter racists from
spreading their messages. See Matsuda, supra note 267, at 2361.
275. See id. at 2381.
276. See ALLPORT, supra note 146, at 472 (discussing the improvement of
ethnic relations from laws prohibiting discrimination in housing, employment
and the armed forces).
277. See id. at 354-66, 497 (arguing that hate speech is not cathartic, but
rather that it solidifies anti-social behavior and can lead to habitual bigotry).
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A. Reconsidering Supreme Court Precedents
The current Supreme Court hate speech doctrine fails to
consider the long term social dangers of hate propaganda. A
historical survey of how speech promoted intolerance until it
instigated the Holocaust, Native American dislocation, and
Black slavery demonstrates the need to reconsider the Su-
preme Court doctrines on hate speech."'
1. Relativistic Roots of the "'Market Place of Ideas"
Doctrine
The "marketplace of ideas" doctrine, which Holmes for-
mulated in Abrams,"9 provided no mechanism for determin-
ing whether specific speech is a conduit to the dissemination
of truths or falsehoods." ° Even John Stuart Mill, the philo-
sophical founder of the "marketplace of ideas" doctrine, rec-
ognized that, "the dictum that truth always triumphs over
persecution is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men re-
peat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but
which all experience refutes. History teems with instances of
truth put down by persecution." 1 The validity of Mill's ob-
servation is born out by United States colonial history. Even
though some leading figures of the American Revolution, such
as Thomas Paine and James Otis, argued that Blacks should
have the same liberty rights as White colonists, the blight of
slavery persisted in the United States."2 The free flow of
abolitionist ideas did not peacefully overcome slavery through
logical arguments about its evils; instead, it took a Civil War
to end that cruel practice.
The Supreme Court has continued adhering to the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" doctrine2" in spite of the many historical
278. See supra Part M.
279. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
280. See ALEXANDER MfEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 87 (1948) (discussing how the "marketplace of ideas" doctrine is
unhelpful in assessing the differences between right and wrong, as well as the
differences between true and false).
281. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 89 (Pelican Classics 1980) (1859).
282. See JENKINS, supra note 191, at 23-24, 33. Former President James
Madison, a slave owner himself, nevertheless called slavery the "original sin."
Letter from James Madison to General Lafayette (Nov. 25, 1820), in 3 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 190 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867).
283. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also supra
Part.II.B (discussing contemporary Supreme Court doctrine).
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examples of hate speech fomenting violence against out-
groups.2" Holmes formulated the "marketplace of ideas" doc-
trine aware that the freedom of expression could be exploited
by a "proletariat dictatorship"285 intent on repressing minority
rights. The potential risk to democratic society from an un-
qualified acceptance of the "market place of ideas" doctrine
becomes apparent upon a close examination of the conceptual
roots of Holmes's First Amendment jurisprudence.
Holmes's view is that "the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market."286 Holmes's message is not immediately
clear because he did not explain what is meant by "the ulti-
mate good desired" or by "truth." However, in Gitlow v. New
York," 7 Holmes clarified his position by arguing that what-
ever the political desires of the group holding power in soci-
ety, the consequences should be accepted even if that group
determines to forcefully impose dictatorial rule. 8 "If in the
long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the commu-
nity, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be
given their chance and have their way."289 Holmes believed
that the ultimate good meant giving free political reign to ex-
pressions that asserted the will of the most powerful, regard-
less of the political ramifications.
His view that government cannot meddle in the market-
place of ideas is rarely scrutinized. Holmes's legal relativism
and skepticism were the philosophical vertebrae of his "mar-
ketplace of ideas" doctrine. According to Holmes, freedom of
speech is a transitory right that the dominant group in soci-
ety (i.e., the majority) can withdraw at its discretion.'
Holmes maintained a relativistic philosophy of law and mor-
als throughout his writings.29' Conceptions of truth, which
according to Holmes are always subjective, are not derived
284. See supra Part III.
285. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
286. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
287. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 652.
288. See 2 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 36 (1941).
289. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
290. See Francis E. Lucey, Holmes-Liberal-Humanitarian-Believer in Democ-
racy?, 39 GEO. L.J. 523, 546 (1951).
291. See Ford, supra note 40, at 266.
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through rational argument but rather imposed by the domi-
nant forces of society.292 Powerful persons determine what is
true and what is good.293 His view that the "free trade of
ideas" is "the best test of truth," therefore, represents the po-
sition that the marketplace of ideas is a means of creating
"truth" rather than of discovering it.
Holmes believed that law is grounded in the will of the
sovereign to exert its "power to compel or punish."294 A legal
right is an "empty substratum" that is useful for predicting
how courts will decide cases, but it is not reflective of an ob-
jective reality. 5 Holmes's view supports the notion that legal
rights are created concepts representing the sovereign's abil-
ity to enforce its will by force. Thus, the sovereign, acting
upon the express will of the majority, has the right to with-
hold liberty and property from outgroup members.
292. See Oliver Wendall Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40
(1918) (writing that "[dleep-seated preferences can not be argued about... and
therefore when differences are sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the other
man rather than let him have his way").
293. See Lucey, supra note 290, at 544.
294. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 6 AM. L. REV. 593 (1871), re-
printed in 44 HARV. L. REV. 788 (1931); see American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
295. See 2 HOLIES, supra note 288, at 212.
296. See Ford, supra note 40, at 257 (stating that Holmes's doctrine "is logi-
cally a step to the proposition that might makes right"). "The fact that Holmes
was a polished gentleman who did not go about like a storm-trooper knocking
people down and proclaiming the supremacy of the blonde [sic] beast should not
blind us to his legal philosophy that might makes right." Ben W. Palmer, Hob-
bes, Holmes and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569, 571 (1945).
Holmes's view that laws are made at the discretion of the powerful is remi-
niscent of Friedrich Nietzsche's theory that the Ubermensch (roughly translated
"Higher Man" or "Superman") must reevaluate orthodox views of good and evil.
See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETzsCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 101 (R. J. Holling-
dale trans., Penguin Classics 1964) (1883-85) (stating that the images of good
and evil should not be referred to as sources of knowledge); Richard A. Posner,
The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 885-86 (1988) (com-
paring the similarity of Nietzsche's convictions on morality to Holmes's views
that the relative worth of laws is based on the views of the dominant group).
Holmes's ideas on morality and law are not, however, identical to those of
Nietzsche. For example, the former believed that the "dominant forces of a
community" should be given the opportunity to establish the institutions of gov-
ernment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (stating that the
"dominant forces of a community" should be given the opportunity to establish a
"proletarian dictatorship" if they so desire). Nietzsche, on the other hand,
mocked herd mentality and extolled the domination of society by the exceptional
Obermensch. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EvIL 111, 114
(Marianne Cowan trans., Gateway Editions 1955) (1886) (writing disparagingly
about herd mentality and extolling an "independent intellect").
200] 767
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Holmes's views are contrary to the social contract theory
of government, which holds that the foremost reason why
people-both those in the dominant group and those in out-
groups-join to form societies and governmental entities is to
secure their natural rights against infringement by others.97
Since Holmes did not believe that there were any natural
rights, the majority owed no ubiquitous duties to the minor-
ity.29 The dominant forces of society may have sympathy for
outgroups; however, they may also exert their rule unsympa-
thetically. Recall Holmes's quote in Gitlow, "If in the long
run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are des-
tined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community,
the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given
their chance and have their way."299 The implication of this
argument is that the dominant members of society may use
the power of speech to repress democracy with its market-
place of ideas and civil rights protections.00
Holmes fills the place of inalienable rights with a subjec-
tive set of laws, enacted and pursued at the discretion of the
"dominant forces of the community.""1 "[T]he ultimate ques-
tion is what do the dominant forces of the community want
and do they want it hard enough to disregard whatever inhi-
bitions may stay in the way."0 2 In Holmes's governmental
scheme, the ultimate judge of laws is the crowd, whose sys-
tem of morality is based on emotional whims.0 3 Its adverse
feelings and prejudices toward outgroups could thereby pro-
pel dominant groups' behavior toward them. Taken to its
logical conclusion, the argument that predominant powers
should have the opportunity to establish a proletarian dicta-
torship by forcefully replacing democracy has horrifying im-
297. See, e.g., JEAN-JAcQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOcIAL CONTRACT 59-60
(Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1987) (1762).
298. See Lucey, supra note 290, at 540.
299. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
300. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) (setting out the "market place of ideas" doctrine); Murray Dry, The
First Amendment Freedoms, Civil Peace and the Quest for Truth, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 325 (1998) (concerning Holmes's apparent belief that speech should
take precedence over democracy).
301. ROUSSEAU, supra note 297, at 187 (quoting a letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to John Wu).
302. Id.
303. See 1 HOLMES, supra note 288, at 163; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals
and Doubts, 10 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1915).
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plications: (1) Jews should be exterminated if Nazi ideology
wins over the majority of people,"4 (2) Blacks should be en-
slaved if that is the will of the majority, and (3) Native
American lands should be violently wrenched away from
them if those people holding political power so decree."'
Such reasoning is diametrically opposed to the pluralistic
principles Holmes espoused elsewhere. Holmes's nihilistic
relativism might be understood to manifest a speculative
view the practical application of which he would have ab-
horred."' ° Other philosophers who have held skeptical views
have nevertheless moderated their ideas when it came to eve-
ryday life.
307
In Whitney v. California,"8 Holmes joined Justice Bran-
deis in a concurring opinion. They recognized that the ulti-
mate purpose of government was to make people free to real-
ize their full potentials. 9 Brandeis and Holmes believed that
the constitutional founders considered liberty in general, and
freedom of thought and speech in particular, to be "the secret
304. As Holmes wrote,
I used to say, when I was young that truth was the majority vote of
that nation that could lick all others. Certainly we may expect that the
received opinion about the present war [World War I] will depend a
good deal upon what side wins (I hope with all my soul it will be mine),
and I think that the statement was correct in so far as it implied that
our test of truth is a reference to either a present or an imagined future
majority in favor of our view.
Holmes, supra note 292, at 40.
305. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 480. But see Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes, writing the dissenting
opinion, made clear that while he believed the right to liberty embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment should not "prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion," he nevertheless thought the consequence of such a policy should not
violate "traditions of our people and our law." Id. Fourteen years after he wrote
the Lochner dissent, Holmes argued that dominant forces should be allowed to
establish a proletarian dictatorship if they so desire. See Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes seems to have
changed his view since proletarian dictatorship, which would presumably tram-
ple on the right to liberty found in the Fourteenth Amendment, has no basis in
United States traditions.
306. See Ford, supra note 40, at 263.
307. See, e.g., DAVD HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 183, 269 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford 1978) (1739) (writing that although the author main-
tained a skeptical philosophy, he nevertheless lived his daily life as if he had a
degree of certainty about his knowledge of empirical reality).
308. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes,
JJ., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (over-
turned on other grounds).
309. See id.
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of happiness."3 ° This view is incompatible with Holmes's
statement that proletarian dictatorship should be given the
opportunity through the marketplace of ideas to suppress the
boons of democracy. Must the United States tolerate the use
of one of its most precious institutions, free speech, to pro-
mote popular despotism targeting historically persecuted
groups?311 Surely the Constitution was not intended to be
used to destroy democracy." 2 Hate speech is expressed both
to exclude targeted outgroups from participatory democracy
and to foment human rights abuses."3
2. The Overlooked Long Term Effects of Hate Speech
The "clear and present danger" test fails to address the
long-term effects of hate speech on the development of auto-
cratic governments.1 4 Courts continue to apply this test in
hate speech cases. This test has been refined to mean that
laws aimed at preventing hate speech are constitutional only
if they target "advocacy... inciting or producing imminent
lawless action."15 First Amendment jurisprudence states that
governments only have a compelling reason to prohibit those
expressions capable of inciting immediate lawless actions.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's theory, however, the seeds
of hate speech often lie dormant until conditions permit them
to sprout into social cancers that pray on outgroups. 16 The
"clear and present danger" test only recognizes those utter-
ances that can elicit pugilistic responses as dangerous. The
test is too narrow, as it fails to consider the real nature of
racist "indoctrination," which develops gradually.1
310. Id. at 375. Brandeis used this background to argue that speech is of
such great value to the examination of whether ideas were true or false, that it
should only be repressed in emergencies. See id.
311. See Mary Ellen Gale, On Curbing Racial Speech, 1 RESPONsiVE
COMMUNITY 47, 48-49 (1990-1991).
312. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1962).
313. See Irwin Cotler, Racist Incitement: Giving Free Speech a Bad Name, in
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE CHARTER 251, 254 (David Schneiderman ed.,
1991).
314. See supra Part III (discussing the historical role of hate speech in the
development of discriminatory laws).
315. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
316. See supra Part Im.
317. Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of
Freedom of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 789, 801.
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Beauharnais v. Illinois is the only First Amendment Su-
preme Court decision where the majority reflected on the his-
torical background of a statute restricting hate speech. 18 At
issue was an Illinois law prohibiting the expression of racist,
group libel. The Court found that, based on Illinois' history of
racist violence, the legislature reasonably concluded that big-
oted utterances "played a significant part" in that turmoil.319
Predicating its decision on empirical evidence about the po-
tential dangers of racially inflammatory speech, the Court
upheld the defendant's conviction."' Beauharnais considered
historical facts rather than simply abstract theory. Therefore,
it represents a more discerning opinion about the potential
harms of hate speech. Moreover, since Beauharnais' utter-
ances were libelous, the Court did not reach the "clear and
present danger" test issues.321
However, the Court failed to follow the Beauharnais ap-
proach of considering the historical perspective when formu-
lating the current common law restriction against the enact-
ment of content-specific hate speech laws. In R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, the majority focused exclusively on protecting the
speaker's First Amendment rights. 2 The justices should
have considered a broader constitutional picture involving the
balancing of First Amendment values against those of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, failed to recognize that freedom of
speech, despite being a right itself, is a powerful tool that can
be manipulated to infringe on constitutional liberties."n Fur-
thermore, the majority did not balance the rights of bigots to
318. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258-59 (1952) (discussing his-
torical instances when racism flared into dangerous violence in Illinois); see su-
pra text accompanying notes 48-55. In 1978, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals questioned whether "Beauharnais would pass constitutional muster
today." Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
953 (1978). In their dissent from a denial of a writ of certiorari in that case,
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist stated that "Beauharnais has never been
overruled or formally limited in any way." Id. (Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dis-
senting).
319. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 259.
320. See id. at 266-67.
32L See id. at 266.
322. See John A. Powell, As Justice Requires/Permits: The Delimitation of
Harmful Speech in a Democratic Society, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 97, 101 (1998); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 125 (1992).
323. See Powell, supra note 322, at 101.
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express their views against the rights of targeted outgroups
to be protected from being buried by the landslide of bigotry.
For example, Justice Scalia did not reflect upon the available
historical examples of cross burnings that instigated the
lynchings of Blacks. Burning a cross on a Black family's lawn
raises issues beyond the free speech of the culprit 2 4 Hate
speech raises concerns of the personal safety of outgroup
members, thereby inhibiting them from freely traveling in
their own communities. Sometimes, fearing for their safety,
outgroup members are forced to move from their homes. Af-
ter a cross has been burnt on their lawn, a Black family is
likely to be leery about approaching their own house. Finally,
the spread of bigotry signals a diminution of egalitarian ide-
als in society. Not only is the United States a society that
tolerates the value of dialogue, but it is also a nation commit-
ted to the principles of racial and ethnic equality.325
The First Amendment should not protect hate speech
that incites others to commit violent or oppressive acts, re-
gardless of when the intended harm is to be perpetrated.326
First Amendment jurisprudence should be reevaluated to
avoid Holmes's relativistic philosophy and its potentially anti-
democratic consequences. Instead of permitting the most
dominant forces of society to express any and all forms of hate
speech, no matter how averse the effect might be on equal
rights, expressions with a reasonable potential to lead domi-
nant groups to maltreat outgroups should be prohibited. At
the very least, the potential of hate speech to cause harm
should be evaluated in light of historical reality, rather than
abstract theory.
B. Western Democracies'Approaches to Hate Speech
Unlike the United States, many foreign countries recog-
nize the dangerousness of hate speech and have enacted
criminal laws to protect targeted outgroups from expositions
of bigotry. 7 In its protection of bigoted rhetoric, the United
324. See id. at 109.
325. See Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 67. Moreover, limitations on certain
forms of speech (e.g., commercial speech and obscene speech) are well estab-
lished in United States First Amendment jurisprudence. See id. at 66.
326. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 255-57 (discussing the forms of speech not
protected by the First Amendment).
327. See Mahoney, supra note 317, at 803.
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States stands apart from the many democracies that punish
the expression of hate propaganda.3 28  Laws penalizing the
dissemination of hate speech exist in the following countries:
Israel, Germany, France, Canada, England, Belgium, Brazil,
Cyprus, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland. 29
In Germany, the law seeks to preserve freedom of expres-
sion while precluding a totalitarian government from reas-
serting its dominion.330 German criminal law prohibits un-
democratic speech, including "the use of... symbols, flags,
uniforms, and forms of address" associated with "organiza-
tions that advocate a non-democratic government."331 Persons
using "flags, insignia, parts of uniforms, slogans and forms of
greeting" to propagate undemocratic political parties, such as
the National Socialist party, are subject to three years of im-
prisonment or a fine.332 Spreading or importing propaganda
supportive of unconstitutional and anti-constitutional politi-
cal parties or associations, such as the Nazi party, may also
result in imprisonment and a fine."33
Germany determined that protecting human rights is
more important than tolerating hate speech.3" Germany also
criminalizes the solicitation of others to commit acts of vio-
lence and arbitrary oppression against members of the popu-
lation; "incite hatred against" them; and "insult them, mali-
ciously exposing them to contempt or slandering them."
335
Another section of the German Criminal Code prohibits per-
sons from disseminating publications or broadcasts that in-
cite others to racial animus or that depict "cruel or otherwise
328. See Lasson, supra note 237, at 72.
329. See Mahoney, supra note 317, at 803; Lasson, supra note 237, at 72
n.286. One example of hate speech that is punishable in those countries is
Holocaust denial. See id.
330. See Paul Lansing & John D. Bailey, The Farmbelt Fuehrer: Conse-
quences of Transnational Communication of Political and Racist Speech, 76
NEB. L. REV. 653, 654-55 (1997).
331. Id. at 655.
332. § 86a StGB, reprinted in Juliane Wetzel, Judicial Treatment of Incite-
ment against Ethnic Groups and of the Denial of National Socialist Mass Mur-
der in the Federal Republic of Germany, in UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR
104-05 n.11 (1993) (translating § 86a of the German Criminal Code). This sec-
tion is part of a title of the German Criminal Code known as, "Crimes that En-
danger the Democratic Legal State." See also Lansing & Bailey, supra note 330,
at 655.
333. See Wetzel, supra note 332, at 104 n.10.
334. See Lasson, supra note 237, at 74.
335. Wetzel, supra note 332, at 105 n.12 (citing § 130 StGB).
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inhumane acts."336 Such measures are meant to stem the tide
of the persistent bigotry in Germany."' These legal measures
protect the German population against expressions of hatred
and incitements to violence, regardless of whether the threat
of harm is imminent.
Canadian law also recognizes the potential dangers of
hate speech. Restrictions on hate propaganda are balanced
against the comprehensive guarantees of free speech provided
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.338 Cana-
dian criminal law prohibits public utterances that promote
"hatred against any identifiable group."3 9  The penalty for
this form of speech is a maximum of two years imprison-
ment." ° Further, inciting others to commit genocide is pun-
ishable by up to five years imprisonment.34' Unlike the
United States Supreme Court precedents, which only place
restrictions on hate speech that presents a "clear and present
danger" of harm,"2 the Canadian Criminal provisions are not
so restrictive. Promotion of genocide, regardless of when the
speaker intends it to be carried out, is criminally punishable.
In making these laws, the Canadian legislature realized the
long-term harmful influence of hate propaganda. Canadian
laws are intended to protect identifiable groups from heinous,
inhumane, and violent crimes.
As the legislatures of other Western countries recognize,
society has a greater interest in protecting outgroup members
from the threat of present and future harms resulting from
hate speech than it has in protecting bigots' right to call for
persecutions against outgroups. Granting unrestricted verbal
336. Id. at n.13 (citing § 131 StGB).
337. See, e.g., Ferdinand Protzman, Music of Hate Raises the Volume in Ger-
many, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at Al (providing information about the growing
popularity of German racist music); Germans Protest Bombing, Cm1. SUN-
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at 41 (showing a group protesting the firebombing of a
synagogue in Germany).
338. Fundamental freedoms under the Charter include: "freedom of thought,
belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media
of communication... [and] freedom of association." CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, Fundamental Freedoms § 2 (visited May 8, 1999)
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/LoiregCharte/consten.html>.
339. Criminal Law, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319(2) (1985) (Can.).
340. See id. § 319(2)(a).
341. See id. § 318(1). Genocidal acts are defined as those done to destroy all
or part of "any identifiable group." Id. § 318(2).
342. See supra text accompanying notes 22,34, and 58.
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freedom at the expense of outgroup members' rights weakens
democracy because all members of the society cannot share
equally in its benefits. Increased suffering in one segment of
society decreases the overall happiness of the political com-
munity. Speech intended to deny civil rights to outgroups is
meant to suppress, not further, democratic ideals. Therefore,
in the best interest of equality and pluralism, there must be
certain limits on hate speech.
C. Restricting Hate Speech in a Democratic Society
Hate speech was a chief component in perpetrating some
of the greatest human tragedies.34 Contrary to many western
democracies that recognize the long-term dangers of hate
speech,3 the United States has kept a "head in the sand" ap-
proach to historical realities by failing to acknowledge that
any but the most immediate dangers can result from words
targeting identifiable outgroups." To prevent the seeds of
hatred from sprouting, the United States should adopt legis-
lation prohibiting certain forms of hate speech.
The legislation proposed in this article intends to protect
outgroups from becoming victims. No identifiable groups, in-
cluding those that have never been targeted by hate mongers,
should be persecuted. However, there is a greater likelihood
that traditional scapegoats will suffer such a fate. United
States common law recognizes that, given the history of intol-
erance, the government has a more compelling interest in
preventing discrimination based on race, alienage, and na-
tional origin than discrimination based on membership in
other identifiable groups. 46 In his concurrence in R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, Justice Blackmun recognized the legitimacy of govern-
ment prohibitions of racially inflammatory symbols, such as
343. See supra Part Im.
344. See supra Part IV.B.
345. See supra Part II.
346. For purposes of this article, discrimination on the basis of race is par-
ticularly important. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (ruling that in
child custody decisions, laws favoring one parent over another solely based on
race are suspect); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (determining that mar-
riage laws containing racially based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (finding that laws classifying
persons by race are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding a law unconstitutional that was facially
discriminatory against Blacks).
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burning crosses or Nazi swastikas.347 Justice Stevens, in a
separate concurrence in R.A.V., argued that the city of St.
Paul could determine which fighting words to regulate based
on the different social harms caused by them. 8
As Blackmun and Stevens recognized, the First Amend-
ment is not an unlimited license for speech. Even the found-
ing fathers did not consider false and injurious speech per-
missible. 49 Contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence
recognizes numerous limitations on different speech, such as
threatening the President,30 electioneering within 100 feet of
a polling place on election day,5 ' operating adult theaters,
35 2
burning draft cards,53 and disseminating pornography." Ar-
guably, like obscenity or threats made against the President,
hate speech has little or no social and political value.5
Similar to child pornography, hate speech is either non-
speech, and therefore not protected by the Constitution, or it
is speech so minor in its potential to elicit democratic values
that its regulation will not limit significant civil liberties.356
Moreover, bigotry is false and, therefore, libelous to the tar-
geted outgroup.357 Like legal disputes over personal libel,
group libel pits the interests of individuals to make false
claims against the interests of targeted groups to live free
from antagonism and false stereotypes, which can restrict a
libeled group's ability to participate in democracy.358
347. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 416 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). For more on the RA.V. decision, see supra text accompanying notes 60-
80.
348. See RA.V., 505 U.S. at 436 (Stevens, J., concurring).
349. Thomas Jefferson wrote James Madison proposing a restricted form of
free speech: "The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak
or to write or otherwise to publish any thing but false facts affecting injuriously
the life, liberty, property, or reputation of others." Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 367 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1958).
350. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
351. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
352. See Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
353. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
354. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
355. See Ogletree, supra note 234, at 502.
356. See Lasson, supra note 10, at 110.
357. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 48-55 (discussing the Beauharnais case).
358. See Matsuda, supra note 267, at 2355.
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While restrictions on hate speech limit bigots from dis-
tributing their vitriolic messages, unrestricted hate speech
has the potential of abrogating a much wider set of liberty in-
terests."9 The argument that hate speech should be tolerated
regardless of its potential consequences depreciates out-
groups' interest to live unmolested lives. The continued abil-
ity of persons across racial and ethnic lines to benefit from
equal rights and freedoms outweighs the interest of individu-
als to make false and divisive speeches aimed at destroying
egalitarianism.3 6 Hate speech perpetuates racial and ethnic
stereotypes that are both meant to maintain discriminatory
practices and provoke hate crimes."'
Hate speech constitutes a significant attack on democ-
racy with potentially long-term effects on the ability of out-
group members to freely exercise their political and constitu-
tional rights."2 The purveyors of hatred rationalize why
outgroups should not have an equal share of rights in the
democratic community, and put outgroup members in fear of
their safety."6 Bigots seek to humiliate, ridicule, and devalue
the common humanity of an identifiable group of people.3"
Bigotry lays the groundwork for future oppression, persecu-
tion, enslavement, genocide, and forceful expropriations.363
"As all fascists know, it is just a matter of time, after hate
propaganda and disparagement have done their work, that
violence will follow."6 Before committing mass acts of op-
pression and persecution, bigots systematically develop and
disseminate a linguistic paradigm that becomes part of daily
communication. With the unrestricted development of hate
speech, the hate of outgroup members becomes more sophisti-
cated and poised for destructive actions.367
However, the need to restrict hate speech does not re-
quire prohibition of all of its manifestations. The First
359. See Lasson, supra note 237, at 80-81; see also supra Part III.A (dis-
cussing the development of totalitarianism from the Weimar democracy to Na-
zism).
360. See JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 220 (20th prtg. 1994).
36L See Powell, supra note 322, at 126.
362. See Cotler, supra note 313, at 254.
363. See Burt Neuborne, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Community
and Hate Speech, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371, 390 (1992).
364. See Mahoney, supra note 317, at 792.
365. See id.
366. Id.
367. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 88, at 478.
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Amendment protects persons making purely abstract argu-
ments about the inferiority of specific groups because their
speech does not advocate present or future violence or perse-
cution.3" Scientific or anthropological arguments, which do
not call for violent action against outgroups, should not be
censured. Bigotry which-when examined in light of histori-
cal patterns of oppression-poses a negligible potential for
stirring people to commit hate crimes, should also remain
protected by the First Amendment.369 Such ideas do not pose
a danger to society, and their presence in political discourse
serves to fine-tune democratic ideals of racial and ethnic
equality.37 ° On the other hand, speech used to incite people to
violent, bigoted actions against outgroups is not benign.371
As discriminatory laws make prejudice more socially ac-
ceptable, so too can outlawing discriminatory practices de-
crease prejudice."2 Some authors argue that prohibiting the
spread of virulently hateful messages strengthens bigots in
their resolve.373 Therefore, they argue against enacting laws
prohibiting hate speech.374 This viewpoint does not consider
that the same argument could be made against the enforce-
ment of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution.7 The existence and
active enforcement of those constitutional provisions signifi-
cantly decreased the occurrence of unequal treatment in
housing and employment, eliminated laws prohibiting Blacks
from voting, and generally decreased the incidents of racism
in the United States. "That the legislative remedy might not
in practice mitigate the evil, or might itself raise new prob-
lems, would only manifest once more the paradox of reform.
It is the price to be paid for the trial-and-error inherent in
368. See Matsuda, supra note 267, at 2364-65.
369. See id.
370. See MILL, supra note 281, at 108 (discussing the value of discourse that
questions accepted ideas).
371. The Supreme Court has stated that expressions that are "simply offen-
sive or disagreeable" to society may not be prohibited. Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
55-56 (1988)).
372. See ALLPORT, supra note 146, at 469.
373. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 363, at 380.
374. See id.
375. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (prohibiting slavery and involuntary servi-
tude), XIV (source for equal protection guarantees), and XV (ensuring voting
rights regardless of race, color, or former status of servitude).
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legislative efforts to deal with obstinate social issues."76
Legislatures cannot be absolutely certain that enacted laws
will eradicate the blight of racism, but the preservation of
democracy and human rights requires the adoption of laws
prohibiting violent forms of hate speech.3
77
D. Delimiting Restrictions on Hate Speech
In order to maintain the integrity of its constitutional
system, the government must protect both equality and free
expression.3 8 Fair treatment of the United States population
is more important to sustaining and nurturing constitutional
principles than is permitting hate speech to prevail in the
marketplace of ideas . 7 9 The value of political dialogue should
be measured by the extent to which it advances equality and
substantive justice.8 ' The dissemination of hatred and calls
to commit violence against outgroups promote political ine-
quality and unfairness.38'
Therefore, hate speech poses a potential threat to Ameri-
can democracy requires federal and state legislation. Based
on principles inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the need to protect
persons with immutable characteristics, such as race, color,
and ethnicity against the tyranny of the majority.382 Analo-
gously, hate speech aimed at harming persons with immuta-
ble characteristics should be prohibited if, based on historic
patterns, such speech has a realistic or actual potential of in-
citing oppression or persecution.
Hate speech has played a significant role in organized
and systematic discrimination and persecution. It is there-
fore critical to enact legislation that is tailored narrowly
enough to protect First Amendment rights, but sufficiently
farseeing to prevent future harms to identifiable outgroups.
376. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952).
377. See id. (supporting the principle that government is a "science of ex-
periment).
378. See Cotler, supra note 313, at 256-57.
379. See Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 87.
380. See id. at 88.
381. See Cotler, supra note 313, at 256-57.
382. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 496 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that immutable characteristics include race and ethnic back-
ground); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that race, national origin, and alienage are immutable characteristics).
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The laws adopted must only prohibit speech that, in its viru-
lent expression of hatred toward outgroups, poses a threat to
republican democracy. The following issues should be consid-
ered in formulating such a policy.
1. Whether the Group Targeted by the Speaker Has Been
Historically Persecuted
Hate speech directed at a historically oppressed and per-
secuted group383 has no political value. Rather than enlight-
ening listeners through accurate depiction of its subjects, hate
speech menaces outgroups by expounding false characteriza-
tions of them.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits all indicia of slav-
ery,38 regardless of how they are manifested. Threatening
signs, such as swastikas and burning crosses, have historical
significances that draw upon and enhance the "badges" and
"symbols" of servitude, discrimination, oppression, and perse-
cution.38 These forms of symbolic speech portend the perpe-
tration of future or imminent destructive acts."' Persons ex-
pressing themselves may not contemporaneously have the
resources to commit acts of oppression or persecution. How-
ever, if calls to future violent actions are left unchecked, the
seeds of hatred, planted and nurtured in the hearts of bigots
can-at opportune moments-lead to violent outbreaks. The
potential of hate speech to bring injustices to fruition makes
it vital to enact laws limiting the lawful use of racially and
ethnically intolerant symbols to non-aggressive purposes,
such as memorabilia collections or historical analyses.
When evaluating which expressions to prohibit, lawmak-
ers should empathize with the historical consciousness of out-
groupsY.3 7 A prejudice remark may not be perceived as dan-
gerous unless it is contextualized in the historical experience
of the targeted outgroup. Legislative proposals should be ad-
383. A "history of purposeful discrimination" is an indicia of membership in a
suspect class of people. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
28 (1973).
38 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 35-36 (1883) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that certain "burdens and disabilities" are the substantive and
visible forms of slavery and they are therefore prohibited by the Thirteenth
Amendment).
385. See Amar, supra note 322, at 157.
386. See id. (discussing the R.A.V. decision).
387. See Matsuda, supra note 267, at 2373.
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vanced against stereotypes that in the past have led their ad-
herents to violate outgroups' human rights.
2. Whether it Is Significantly Probable that the
Dissemination of Racially or Ethnically Derogatory
Remarks Will Elicit Violence, Persecution, or
Oppression Against Targeted Outgroups
Statutes should prohibit epithets reasonably capable of
eliciting violence, vandalism, or discrimination against identi-
fiable outgroups. Depictions that minimize the social value of
outgroup members gradually deteriorate pluralism and make
degradation and persecution more socially tolerable."' By
depicting outgroups as sub-humans, it becomes easier for big-
ots to commit uncensored acts of violence and discrimina-
tion.389 Charismatic leaders should be prohibited from har-
nessing racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic ideologies.
Criminal statutes can serve as deterrents against the spread
of active prejudice and prevent the deterioration of social mo-
res and attitudes toward outgroups.
Even during times of social and fiscal tranquility, when
there is no imminent threat of racial and ethnic intolerance,
legislative policy should still prohibit hate speech and protect
against moral and economic deterioration. Often during
times of national crisis, racism and anti-Semitism draw per-
sons, who were formerly only ideologues, to vehemently op-
press and murder members of despised outgroups.390 The po-
tential for speech that is relatively benign today to take a
malignant form tomorrow should not be taken for granted.39'
388. See Lasson, supra note 237, at 70.
389. See id. Part II.A. of this article argues that the Holocaust was rooted in
traditional German anti-Semitism spread by oral and written utterances; that
this ideological stage made possible racially discriminatory laws that were en-
acted with the approbation of most Germans; finally, that the propaganda so
deadened people's consciences that they committed acts of genocide and torture
with equanimity. Kenneth Lasson briefly discussed this progression. See id.
390. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 464.
391. Another important issue, which is beyond the scope of this article, con-
cerns the need to redress the emotional harm outgroup members suffer when
they are targeted by hate speech. See Keith N. Hylton, Implications of Mill's
Theory of Liberty for the Regulation of Hate Speech and Hate Crimes, 3 U. Cm.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 52 (1996).
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3. Whether the Speaker Intended His Declarations to
Cause Criminal Acts such as Violence, Oppression,
Discrimination, or Persecution to Be Taken Against
an Outgroup...
In incitement cases, the Supreme Court considers the
speaker's intent material.3 In Schenck v. United States, the
Court upheld the defendant's conviction for printing and dis-
tributing a pamphlet that equated conscription with involun-
tary servitude. 4 The Court found that by mailing the pam-
phlet, Schenck manifested the intent to obstruct the
government from conscripting soldiers.9
Pursuant to the holding in Schenck, an element of future
hate speech legislation must require proof that the speaker
intended to encourage persons to commit inhumane acts
against an identifiable outgroup. By adding a scienter ele-
ment to hate speech legislation, lawmakers assure that theo-
retical utterances will not be punished. This intent require-
ment protects First Amendment rights while punishing
utterances outside First Amendment protection.
Hate speech that is intended to elicit violent responses
from bigots can be dangerous both when it is uttered and in
the future. At the time of the utterance, the menace may be
in its developmental stage, but the ultimate intended ends-
inhumane acts and civil rights abuses against outgroups-ma-
terialize after systematic development. It is unpredictable
how far the hateful flames produced by one ember of bigotry
can spread.9 It is only reasonable for the government to seek
to extinguish bigotry before it burns out of control to consume
society in the flames of totalitarianism or fascism. A law pro-
hibiting speech intended to raise a following of people willing
to act violently is not arbitrary, but rather conscious of his-
toric examples in which racist and anti-Semitic rhetoric led to
violence, enslavement, deportation, and genocide.397 The gov-
ernment should not stand idly by while intentionally volatile
392. Reckless oratory that has a realistic potentiality of leading to harms di-
rected at a historically oppressed group might also be sufficient for culpability.
393. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
394. See id. at 49-50, 53.
395. See id. at 51.
396. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925) (discussing the dan-
gers of revolutionary speech).
397. See id.
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speech consolidates the forces of bigotry to infringe upon
autonomy rights and to destroy democratic ideals; instead, it
should "suppress the threatened danger in its inception."9 "
A speaker who intends listeners to commit a diabolical
scheme against a historically oppressed group of people
should be held criminally responsible before governmental
inaction compromises public safety.399  Eventually, hate
speech may cross a juncture whereupon the protagonist suc-
ceeds in inciting his followers to hurt and/or oppress out-
groups. Bigots intending their words to be part of an incre-
mental plan to efface equal rights should be prosecuted to
deter future persecution. Hate speech aimed at the long term
development of racial and ethnic animus is even more dan-
gerous than hate speech posing only an immediate threat of
harm. The deliberate and knowing orchestration of prejudice
whittles away those social mores that are based on equality.
Systematic hate propaganda is easier to marshal and sustain
than utterances that seek immediate, singular acts of vio-
lence.00 Therefore, the former is capable of eliciting greater
harms than the latter.
4. If the Speech Involves Religious Beliefs, then
Incitement Laws Must be Neutral
Religion is often used to spread intolerant hatred. The
institution of slavery was justified on the basis of religion0 '
and terrorism has been fomented by religious vitriol.4"'
Therefore, the government should adopt a set of legal guide-
lines to prohibit the use of religion as a catalyst for oppres-
sion, while simultaneously protecting the First Amendment
right to freely exercise religion. Where the state has a com-
pelling interest in protecting the well-being of its citizens
398. Id.
399. See Murray Dry, Free Speech in Political Philosophy and Its Relation to
American Constitutional Law: A Consideration of Mill, Meiklejohn, and Plato,
11 CONST. COMMENT. 81, 99 (1994).
400. See supra Part III.
40L See supra text accompanying notes 191-96.
402. See, e.g., Nicholas Goldberg, People Behind Militancy, NEWSDAY, Apr. 4,
1999, at B13 (regarding an Islamic fundamentalist preacher justifying the use
of terrorism); Patrick McMahon, Abortion Opponent's Banquet to Honor Militant
Defendant in Ore. Lawsuit Calls Use of Force Justifiable, USA TODAY, Jan. 21,
1999, at 5A (discussing the support of terrorist tactics by some Christian fun-
damentalists).
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against the development of violent bigotry, it can enact nar-
rowly drafted laws that prohibit religious hate speech.4 3
Courts traditionally refuse to "approve, disapprove, clas-
sify, regulate, or in any manner control sermons delivered at
religious meetings."44 The proscription against governmental
meddling in religious tenets and institutions should be main-
tained.4"5 However, hate speech couched in religious termi-
nology should be banned when it poses a significant danger to
public welfare. The victim of a hate crime suffers no less if
his persecutor is a religious, rather than a secular, bigot.
Laws passed to prevent religiously inspired hate speech
should not discriminate against any specific religion. Fur-
thermore, no policy should be adopted to regulate or limit re-
ligious speech which does not threaten the human rights of
identifiable groups of people.
Hate speech that is nominally couched in doctrinal tenets
should not be protected simply because it uses religious ter-
minology. Courts should evaluate expert witness testimony,
the content of the message, and whether a substantially
similar message, expressed in like circumstances, has previ-
ously incited people to commit acts of violence or oppression
against the targeted outgroup. 4°0 First Amendment protec-
tions are not absolute, and they should be weighed against
the right of individuals to enjoy their lives without realistic
threats of religious intolerance.
V. CONCLUSION
United States First Amendment jurisprudence protects
the right of individuals to expound hateful messages against
historically persecuted outgroups as long as they do not pose
403. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (stating that to
regulate content-based religious speech, the state must have a compelling inter-
est and the law must be drafted as narrowly as possible to achieve the desired
end).
404. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (reversing and remand-
ing the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for preaching at a public meeting).
405. See Grinstein, supra note 8, at 1367.
406. See id. at 1379. If an orator's sermon calls for the persecution or de-
struction of outgroups, and an 'overt act" is taken by the orator in furtherance
of that call, then the speaker may be charged with aggravated conspiracy. See
id. at 1377-78; United States v. Offutt, 127 F.2d 336, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(stating that "overt acts" in furtherance of a crime are "manifestations that a
conspiracy is at work").
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an imminent danger to others.40 7  In contrast, numerous
Western democracies, such as Canada and Germany, protect
free speech while enacting and enforcing criminal laws pro-
hibiting hate propaganda.4" Democracy is not a license for
absolute liberty. Protecting individuals' rights to freely dis-
seminate hate propaganda should be counterbalanced against
the more important democratic, social values: civil rights and
human happiness. The First Amendment should not protect
hate speech intended to cause oppression or persecution of
specific groups of people.
Hate speech, Supreme Court Justice White said, is politi-
cally "worthless and undeserving of constitutional protec-
tion."' 0 Bigots in the United States and elsewhere have re-
peatedly used hate speech to spread stereotypes about
outgroups. Once the stereotypes became part of the collective
cultural psyche, disparaged outgroups were discriminated
against, enslaved, and even killed.
Some constitutional commentators argue that it is un-
necessary to create laws in the United States to punish any
but the most imminently dangerous forms of hate speech.410
According to their arguments, the United States, unlike coun-
tries such as Germany, does not have a long history of big-
otry; therefore, it is unnecessary to punish hate speech unless
it poses an immediate threat to public order.41 This argu-
ment is based on abstract legal theory, but not grounded on
empirical and historical evidence. The propagation of de-
meaning generalizations about Native Americans and Blacks
helped establish the schema of social mores that justified and
perpetuated expropriations, dislocations, and cruelties
against Native Americans, and that justified and sanctioned
Black slavery and disenfranchisement. Furthermore, the
widespread dissemination of anti-Semitic rhetoric in Ger-
many prior to and until the rise of the Nazi party demon-
strates how quickly bigotry can flare into a virtually uncon-
407. See supra Part II.
408. See supra Part IV.B.
409. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 401 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
410. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, Hate Speech: The Present Implications of a His-
torical Dilemma, 37 VILL. L. REV. 743, 754 (1992). See also supra Part II.
411. See Abrams, supra note 410, at 754. "There are no current risks of the
communal violence that has plagued India... no history, fortunately, such as
that of Germany." Id. (arguing that the restrictions on speech that are neces-
sary in those countries are unnecessary in the United States).
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trollable conflagration.412 Language plays a significant role in
structuring social relationships. Hate crimes, discrimination,
oppression, and persecution are almost inevitable413 in a soci-
ety that allows its linguistic "paradigms" to interweave big-
otry into everyday speech. To avoid the recurrence of the
greatest crimes against humanity, laws should be adopted
prohibiting the dissemination of those racial and ethnic
stereotypes that have a reasonable potential of eliciting
crimes against outgroups.
412. The Nazi party received only 2.61% of the total vote in the May 20, 1928
German elections. See SHIRER, supra note 141, at 118; Kretzmer, supra note 1,
at 464. By July 1932, the National Socialist party received 37% of the vote. See
SHIEER, supra note 141, at 185. Then, on January 30, 1933, Hitler became
Chancellor of Germany, and the fate of the six million Jews who died in the
Holocaust was sealed. See id. at 187.
413. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 88, at 479-80.
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